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White House Electronic Mail and Federal Recordkeeping 
Law: Press ''D" To Delete History 
James D. Lewis 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past two decades, the Watergate and Iran-Contra scan-
dals have produced far-reaching inquiries into the activities and de-
cisions of the J;>resident and his White House staff. In both cases, 
investigators have tried to determine what the President knew and 
when he knew it.1 The Watergate scandal spawned extensive litiga-
tion over the issue of access to presidential materials2 and ulti-
mately led Congress to enact the Presidential Records Act of 1978 
(PRA),3 which asserts public ownership of presidential records and 
establishes presidential record management procedures.4 The diffi-
culties encountered during investigation of the Iran-Contra affair,s 
however, suggest that the PRA fails to ensure the preservation and 
availability of historically signifk~t White House materials. 
Indeed, the PRA cannot possibly regulate all White House re-
cordkeeping practices, because the statute covers only those 
records created or received by the President, the Vice President, 
and immediate presidential staff and advisors.6 As a result, if 
1. For an account of the Watergate scandal, see CARL BERNSTEIN & BoB WooowARD, 
Au. nm PREsrnENT's MEN (1974). A joint report issued by the House and Senate Select 
Committees that investigated the Iran-Contra affair provides a detailed factual summary of 
that scandal. See H.R. REP. No. 433, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 3-11 (1987). For an examination 
of the constitutional dimensions of the Iran-Contra scandal, see HAR.ow H. Kou, THE NA-
TIONAL SECURITY CoNSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFrnR TIIE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 
(1990). 
2. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See generally Csrl Bretscher, The President and Judicial Review 
Under the Records Acts, 60 GEo. WASH. L. R:Ev. 1477, 1482-83 (1992) (surveying Watergate 
litigation). 
3. Pub. L No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207 
(1988)). 
4. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2202-2203 (1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 1487, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5732, 5733 ("The purpose of [the PRA] is (1) to estab-
lish the public ownership of records created by future Presidents and their staffs ••• and (2) 
to establish procedures governing the preservation and public availability of these records 
..•. "). See generally Bretscher, supra note 2, at 1481-84 (reviewing the history of ownership 
of presidential records). 
5. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 433, supra note 1, at xvi ("[M]embers of the [National Security 
Council] staff shredded relevant contemporaneous documents in the fall of 1986. Conse-
quently, objective evidence that could have resolved the inconsistencies and overcome the 
failures of memory was denied to the Committees - and to history."). 
6. See 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2) (1988) (defining "Presidential records"): 44 U.S.C. § 2207 
(1988) (subjecting vice-presidential records to the provisions of the PRA); see also infra note 
82 and accompanying text. 
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National Security Council (NSC) officials improperly destroyed 
Iran-Contra materials that they created or received while acting 
outside their roles as direct presidential advisors, the PRA would 
not apply to such transgressions.7 Unless federal law imposes uni-
form recordkeeping duties on White House officials regardless of 
the presidential or nonpresidential status of particular White House 
materials, those officials will be able to evade their recordkeeping 
responsibilities by expediently designating records to fit under the 
most lenient statutory regim.e.s 
Accordingly, because the PRA does not reach beyond presiden-
tial records, any attempt to reform White House recordkeeping 
must reconcile the PRA with the two additional statutes that bear 
upon White House recordkeeping and record disclosure practices: 
the Federal Records Act (FRA)9 and the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA).10 The PRA and the FRA both regulate recordkeeping 
practices, but they govern mutually exclusive sets of records: the 
FRA covers. records "made or received by an agency of the United 
States Govemment,"11 including White House agencies such as the 
NSC, while the PRA covers only presidential records, which are 
explicitly defined as excluding "official records of an agency. "12 In 
contrast to the recordkeeping focus of the PRA and the FRA, the 
FOIA governs public disclosure of agency records13 but sets no re-
7. See Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 286 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1991} (suggesting that some, 
but not all, White House entities create presidential records covered by the PRA and sug-
gesting that the NSC might create both presidential and nonpresidential records}. 
8. For example, because the PRA grants an incumbent president great discretion in re-
cordkeeping decisions, see Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 286, the Reagan Administration would 
have been motivated to claim, for recordkeeping purposes, that NSC officials were acting as 
presidential advisors when creating documents that described Iran-Contra operations, re-
gardless of President Reagan's direct knowledge of those operations. Such documents would 
then have been presidential records, .and the President would have been free to dispose of 
them. In fact, the Clinton Administration appeared to be taking advantage of this malleable 
distinction between presidential and nonpresidential records when it recently asserted that, 
contrary to prior practice and to the aforementioned dicta in Armstrong, see supra note 7, the 
NSC's "sole role [is] to advise and assist the President," and thus the discretionary features of 
the PRA apply to all NSC records. See Douglas Jehl, White House Curbs Access to Security 
Council's Data, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 26, 1994, at A6. 
Moreover, because White House scandals such as Iran-Contra generally raise the ques-
tion of presidential knowledge of improper activities, it makes no sense to have the record-
keeping responsibilities of a White House official ·tum on whether that official was 
performing presidential or nonpresidential duties; such a distinction would beg a key ques-
tion in a White House scandal. 
9. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2118, 2501-2506, 2901-2909, 3101-3107, 3301-3324 (1988). The FRA 
actually consists of several related acts, but this Note adop.ts and expands upon the conven-
tion of the district court in Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 345 n.2 (D.D.C. 1989), 
referring to all such related acts jointly as the Federal Records Act. 
10. Pub~L. No. 90-23, 81Stat.54 (1967) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)). 
11. 44 u.s.c. § 3301 (1988). 
12. 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2}(B)(i) (1988). 
13. ~ U.S.C. § 552(a}(3) (1988}. 
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cord.keeping standards.14 Although the FOIA refers only to agency 
records, the PRA explicitly provides for eventual public disclosure 
of presidential records under the FOIA as wen.1s Because each 
statute has a distinct role - the PRA and the FRA governing pres-
idential and agency record.keeping practices and the FOIA control-
ling public disclosure of White House records - any congressional 
or judicial response to the problems presented by the Iran-Contra 
scandal must consider the interaction of these federal statutes. 
In addition to highlighting this statutory interplay, the Iran-Con-
tra scandal also introduced another novelty not present in Water-
gate: evidence of White House plans and activities might have been 
captured in electronic mail (e-mail) messages exchanged among 
White House officials.16 When journalist Scott Armstrong, the Na-
tional Security Archive, and other private citizens and public inter-
est groups brought suit on the final day of the Reagan Presidency to 
prevent destruction of any information still remaining in the White 
House e-mail system and on backup computer tapes,17 they faced 
not only the typical legal obstacles that block access to presidential 
records1s but also the task of convincing a court that e-mail should 
be regulated by the same record.keeping and record disclosure laws 
that govern more traditional White House documents.19 Arm-
strong and his fellow plaintiffs argued that the PRA and the FRA 
limit the power of White House officials to dispose of e-mail and 
that at least some e-mail retained under the PRA or the FRA 
should be available to the public under the FOJA.20 
Having twice reached the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
Armstrong litigation has addressed some basic issues of federal re-
14. See Armstrong, 721 F. Supp. at 345 ("FOIA ••. is a disclosure statute, and a disclosure 
statute only; it imposes no obligations and provides no guidance for the creation or disposal 
of particular records."). 
15. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(c)(l) (1988). 
16. See Armstrong, 721 F. Supp. at 345 n.1; Bretscher, supra note 2, at 1479. 
17. Armstrong, 721 F. Supp. at 347; see also Bretscher, supra note 2, at 1479-80. 
18. These obstacles include the assertion of executive privilege, see, e.g., United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), lack of private party standing to bring a suit, see, e.g., Kissinger v. 
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1980); see also infra note 
151, and lack of judicial review of presidential actions, see, e.g., Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 
282, 289-91 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also infra notes 157-61, 190-94 and accompanying text. 
19. See Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 810 F. Supp. 335, 340-42 (D.D.C. 
1993). 
20. 721 F. Supp. at 347. The district court ordered that all computer tapes containing 
White House e-mail be preserved pending resolution of the lawsuit. 721 F. Supp. at 348. The 
court later held the White House defendants in contempt of court for, among other reasons, 
damaging the computer tapes during their transfer to the Archivist on the final days of the 
Bush Presidency. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 821 F. Supp. 761, 768-69 
(D.D.C. 1993). This contempt order was, however, vacated by the D.C. Circuit on other 
grounds. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1289-90 (D.C. Cir. 
1993). 
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cordkeeping law. First, Armstrong v. Bush (Armstrong J)21 consid-
ered the availability and extent of judicial review of White House 
compliance with the PRA and the FRA. The court concluded that 
the FRA permits limited judicial review of White House agency 
compliance with recordkeeping law but that the PRA precludes 
judicial review of presidential recordkeeping decisions.22 Next, 
Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President (Armstrong IJ)23 
considered whether the recordkeeping statutes cover electronic 
mail. The court affirmed that e-mail is not intrinsically beyond the 
reach of federal recordkeeping law24 and that existing White House 
agency guidelines for managing e-mail failed to meet FRA 
requirements.25 
Despite this extensive litigation, Armstrong has left several 
White House recordkeeping issues unresolved. Armstrong has not 
yet established the right of eventual public access to White House 
electronic communications, and the courts have not yet ordered any 
FOIA disclosures of Reagan Administration e-mail.26 Nor has the 
litigation ensured that similar communications will be preserved in 
the future because the Armstrong courts have yet to determine the 
necessary features of a White House electronic mail guideline that 
would satisfy the dictates of federal recordkeeping law.21 Thus the 
21. 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
22. 924 F.2d at 2'17. In determining the scope of review under the FRA, Armstrong I first 
established that courts may review the adequacy of White House agency recordkeeping 
guidelines, including NSC guidelines that control the disposition of electronic mail messages. 
924 F.2d at 291-94. The court next distinguished between the White House agency staff at 
large, whose compliance with recordkeeping guidelines cannot be challenged by private par-
ties, and a select few officials, including the Archivist of the United States and White House 
agency heads, who are subject to judicial review because of their special enforcement duties 
under the FRA. 924 F.2d at 294-96. 
23. 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
24. 1 F.3d at 1282-84. 
25. 1 F.3d at 1284-87. On remand, the district court is reviewing the adequacy of new 
White House guidelines for the retention of e-mail and is also considering the plaintiffs' re-
quest for disclosure of White House e-mail under the FOIA. 1 F.3d at 1296; Armstrong v. 
Executive Office of the President, 830 F. Supp. 19, 20 (D.D.C. 1993). 
26. Because White House e-mail has yet to be disclosed under the FOIA, the only indica-
tions that these mail messages may contain valuable historical information have come from 
investigations that have successfully subpoenaed portions of the mail preserved on computer 
tapes. See Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 821 F. Supp. 761, 768-69 (D.D.C. 
1993) (noting the use of the computer tapes in Iran-Contra investigations and in the investi-
gation of the State Department's search for information about President Clinton during the 
1992 presidential campaign). The government's Iran-Contra investigations may indirectly 
lead to speedier public disclosure of some White House e-mail; for example, the district court 
granted the Armstrong plaintiffs' motion to compel preparation of a so-called Vaughn index, 
which itemizes and describes the contents of records being withheld by the government, see 
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1973), as a first step toward FOIA disclosure 
of e-mail messages already printed out for use in the criminal case against Caspar 
Weinberger. Armstrong, 830 F. Supp. at 21, 24. 
27. In part as a response to the Armstrong litigation, the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA) recently proposed standards for electronic mail management that 
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Armstrong litigation, spanning three presidential administrations 
and with no end in sight, demonstrates how federal law has so far 
failed to facilitate straightforward judicial evaluation of White 
House electronic mail management practices and procedures. 
Specifically, the Iran-Contra scandal and the Armstrong litiga-
tion reveal three major weaknesses in the current statutory scheme 
that governs maintenance of and access to White House computer-
based information. First, current law attempts to serve two pur-
poses, a~strative ef:ficiency28 and preservation of a historical 
record,29 that may suggest conflicting recordkeeping priorities and 
practices. Second, Congress has opted to weaken some enforce-
ment provisions of the recordkeeping statutes in deference to sepa-
ration of powers concerns that arise whenever Congress or the 
courts attempt to regulate or review executive branch activities.30 
Finally, current law often fails to resolve the issues raised by the 
evolution from paper-based to electronic government communica-
tions; for example, the statutes focus on "records," but information 
can be electronically represented in various forms that may not be 
precisely analogous to records.31 These statutory infirmities cast 
doubt upon the congressional claim that under the PRA "the pres-
ervation of the historical record of future Presidencies [is] 
assured."32 
This Note argues that federal recordkeeping law should pro-
mote the preservation of history above all other concerns. First, 
courts should construe and apply the recordkeeping statutes with 
this goal in mind. Second, Congress should amend the recordkeep-
would apply to all federal agencies. 59 Fed. Reg. 13,906 (1994) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. 
pt 1234) (proposed Mar. 24, 1994). These standards will be considered infra in section IIl.B. 
28. See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 149 (1980) 
(citing a Senate report to support the argument that the FRA is meant to facilitate effective 
government records management rather than private-party access to those records). 
29. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5733 
(stating that under the PRA "the preservation of the historical record of future Presidencies 
would be assured"); H.R. REP. No. 876, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267, 6269 (stating that the Freedom of Information Act "guarantees the right 
of persons to know about the business of their government"). 
30. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5737 
(noting congressional separation of powers concerns when enacting the PRA); see also Bret-
scher, supra note 2, at 1495-1508 (discussing separation of powers difficulties in the context of 
Armstrong I). The extent to which Congress may permissibly regulate executive branch re-
cordkeeping activities is discussed infra at notes 223-46 and accompanying text. 
31. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CoNGRESS, INFORMING nm NATION: 
FEDERAL INFORMATION DISSEMINATION IN AN ELECTRONIC AoE 8 (1988) [hereinafter 
OTA, INFORMING nm NATION] ("[E]lectronic technology is changing or even eliminating 
many distinctions between reports, publications, databases, records, and the like, in ways not 
anticipated by existing statutes and policies." (emphasis omitted)); Jamie A. Grodsky, The 
Freedom of Information Act in the Electronic Age: The Statute is Not User Friendly, 31 
JURIMETRICS J. 17, 17-19 (1990). 
32. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5733. 
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ing statutes to correct enforcement deficiencies that leave irrespon-
sible recordkeeping practices unchecked and risk the loss of a 
historical record of White House decisionmaking. Finally, execu-
tive officials should adopt guidelines that identify and preserve his-
torically significant materials regardless of the medium in which 
they are captured. 
Part I of this Note examines the statutes that currently regulate 
the management and public disclosure of White House information 
and argues that this existing scheme dictates that the preservation 
of history should generally prevail over administrative convenience. 
Next, Part II finds that the enforcement mechanisms available 
under current recordkeeping law leave the historical record overly 
vulnerable to irresponsible government recordkeeping practices 
and concludes that Congress can augment the existing enforcement 
scheme without offending separation of powers principles. Part III 
then argues that the regulatory framework should be applied to 
modem means of communication such as electronic mail because 
such means are increasingly used to relay historically significant in-
formation among government officials. Th.is Note concludes that 
the overall recordkeeping regime can and should be reshaped -
through judicial interpretation, legislative revision, and executive 
guidelines - to ensure that White House recordkeeping practices 
serve the public interest in historical preservation. 
I. THE EXISTING STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
The current federal statutory framework divides government 
information-related responsibilities into two distinct functions regu-
lated by separate and exclusive laws.33 On the one hand, the gov-
ernment must manage information, which includes the creation, 
retention, and disposal of records in order to carry out and docu-
ment government activities; the FRA and the PRA regulate these 
information management practices. On the other hand, the govern-
ment must also disclose information to the public; the FOIA regu-
lates this duty to disclose. Though separate statutes govern these 
management and disclosure duties, the duties themselves are 
clearly interrelated: a duty to disclose a particular type of informa-
tion is meaningless without a corresponding duty to retain the infor-
mation in the first place.34 This relationship between information 
33. See Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 345 (D.D.C. 1989) (noting the distinction 
between the FOIA, which is a disclosure statute, and the FRA and the PRA, which control 
the creation, retention, and disposal of records). 
34. Reflecting the dual nature of government information responsibilities, the Armstrong 
plaintiffs submitted FOIA requests to various White House entities calling for disclosure of 
the contents of their e-mail systems and also filed a lawsuit seeking injunctive and declara-
tory relief based on their claim that the White House had failed to manage e-mail in accord-
ance with the PRA and the FRA. 721 F. Supp. at 347. 
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retention and disclosure suggests that weaknesses in one element of 
the statutory framework could undermin,e the effectiveness of other 
elements. Accordingly, this Part examines the provisions and pur-
poses of the FRA, the PRA, and the FOIA, and it argues that 
courts should interpret and reconcile these statutes with the princi-
pal goal of ensuring the preservation of a historical record of gov-
ernment activity. 
A. The Federal Records Act 
1. The Procedures and Scope of the FRA 
The FRA is a series of statutes that govern the creation, man-
agement, and disposal of federal records.35 This collection of stat-
utes defines general standards and procedures for record retention 
and disposal, requires particular executive officials to develop more 
specific guidelines and procedures, and establishes a scheme of ad-
ministrative oversight to enforce recordkeeping duties. 
Under the FRA, the basic unit of government information is the 
record. The FRA explicitly defines records as "includ[ing] all 
books, papers, maps, photographs, machine readable materials, or 
other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or charac-
teristics. "36 The FRA dictates that such materials qualify as records 
if they serve as "evidence of the organization, functions, policies, 
decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Govern-
ment or because of the informational value of data in them."37 By 
limiting its coverage to records "made or received by an agency,"38 
the FRA regulates only the recordkeeping activities of federal gov-
ernment agencies. Fmally, the FRA provides exclusive procedures 
for disposal of records; once a record comes into existence, it may 
not be "alienated or destroyed" except in accordance with the 
FRA.39 
The provisions of the FRA define two key federal recordkeep-
ing roles. First, the head of each agency has several statutory du-
ties, including "mak[ing] and preserv[ing] records containing 
adequate and proper documentation of the organization, functions, 
policies, decisions, procedures, and essential transactions of the 
35. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2118, 2501-2506, 2901-2909, 3101-3107, 3301-3324 (1988); see supra 
note 9; see also American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
("[T]hese laws establish a unified system for handling the 'life cycle' of federal records -
covering their creation, maintenance and use, and eventually their disposal by either destruc-
tion· or deposit for preservation."). 
36. 44 u.s.c. § 3301 (1988). 
37. 44 u.s.c. § 3301 (1988). 
38. 44 u.s.c. § 3301 (1988). 
39. 44 U.S.C. § 3314 (1988); see also Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 285 (D.C. Cir. 
1991). 
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agency"40 and "establish[ing] safeguards against the removal or loss 
of records he determines to be necessary and required by regula-
tions of the Archivist. ''41 Second, the FRA requires the Archivist 
of the United States, a presidential appointee subject to Senate con-
firmation,42 to "provide guidance and assistance to Federal agen-
cies,"43 to "promulgate standards, procedures, and guidelines with 
respect to records management,"44 and to "conduct inspections or . 
surveys of the records and the records management programs and 
practices within and between Federal agencies."45 
The FRA also specifies exclusive procedures for the disposal of 
federal records. Both the agency head and the Archivist participate 
in the threshold decision whether to preserve a record; records may 
only be disposed of if they "do not appear to have sufficient admin-
istrative, legal, research, or other value to warrant their further 
preservation."46 If an agency believes that certain records warrant 
disposal, the agency head must submit a list of those records to the 
Archivist.47 If the Archivist agrees that the records need not be 
preserved, then the agency may dispose of the records but only "af-
ter publication of notice in the Federal Register and an opportunity 
for interested persons to submit comment thereon."48 The Archi-
vist may consult with Congress regarding a record disposal decision. 
if the Archivist thinks a set of records "may be of special interest to 
Congress," or when "consultation with the Congress regarding the 
disposal of those particular records is in the public interest."49 Fi-
nally, the Archivist may empower an agency to dispose of records 
of a specified "form or character" when such records are "common 
to several or all agencies"50 or when that agency has previously 
been authorized to dispose of such records.51 
If records are being disposed of contrary to the provisions of the 
FRA, the Archivist and the agency head assume enforcement roles. 
If either the Archivist or the agency head learns of "any actual, 
impending, or threatened unlawful removal, defacing, alteration, or 
40. 44 u.s.c. § 3101 (1988). 
41. 44 u.s.c. § 3105 (1988). 
42. 44 U.S.C. § 2103(a) (1988). 
43. 44 U.S.C. § 2904(a) (1988). 
44. 44 U.S.C. § 2904(c)(l) (1988). 
45. 44 U.S.C. § 2904(c)(7) (1988). 
46. 44 U.S.C. § 3303(2) (1988) (listing the criteria to be applied by the agency head); 44 
U.S.C. § 3303a(a) (1988) (listing the criteria to be applied by the Archivist). 
47. 44 u.s.c. § 3303 (1988). 
48. 44 U.S.C. § 3303a(a) (1988). 
49. 44 U.S.C. § 3303a(c) (1988). 
50. 44 U.S.C. § 3303a( d) (1988). 
51. 44 u.s.c. § 3308 (1988). 
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destruction of records,"52 then the one learning of the violation 
must notify the other, and the Archivist must "assist the head of the 
agency in initiating action through the Attorney General for the 
recovery of records unlawfully removed and for other redress pro-
vided by law."53 If the agency head fails to pursue an action 
through the Attorney General as required, then the Archivist must 
ask the Attorney General to initiate the action and must also notify 
Congress.54 The FRA specifies only these enforcement roles; it 
does not expressly provide a private cause of action to prevent or 
redress the unlawful removal or destruction of agency records,55 
nor does it explicitly authorize judicial review of the recordkeeping 
duties it imposes on the agencies and the Archivist. 
2. The Purposes of the FRA 
Given the piecemeal enactment of the various provisions of the 
FRA,56 courts have looked to legislative history to identify overrid-
ing purposes that might unite the FRA and lead to consistent inter-
pretation.57 Unfortunately, because the legislative history is 
fragmented, courts disagree about the relative importance of two 
basic yet potentially contradictory FRA purposes. On the one 
hand, the FRA may serve primarily to facilitate administrative effi-
ciency in government recordkeeping and may therefore simply be 
seen as providing clear-cut criteria and mechanisms for creating and 
retaining records that will help the government do its work. On the 
other hand, the FRA's main purpose may be to ensure the preser-
vation of a historical record of governmental decisionmaking. In 
that case, the FRA would provide standards that emphasize the his-
torical significance of information and safeguards that prevent self-
serving record management and disposal -. even if such measures 
might hinder administrative efficiency to some extent. 
52. 44 U.S.C. § 2905(a) (1988). 
53. 44 U.S.C. § 2905(a) (1988) (archivist duties); 44 U.S.C. § 3106 (1988) (agency head 
duties). The FRA does not specify the range of actions the Attorney General may pursue 
after being notified of the unlawful removal or destruction of records, but the FRA clearly 
contemplates that the Attorney General may file a lawsuit. See Kissinger v. Reporters 
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 148 (1980) ("[T]he Attorney General may 
bring suit to recover the records."). 
54. 44 U.S.C. § 2905(a) (1988). 
55. See Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 148 (noting that the FRA "establishes only one r~medy for 
the improper removal of a 'record' from the agency:" notification of the Attorney General). 
The availability of an implied private cause of action alleging FRA violations is considered 
infra at notes 154-56, 172-89 and accompanying text. 
56. See supra note 9. 
57. See, e.g., Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 149; American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 
F.2d 29, 55-57 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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In Kissinger v. Reponers Committee for Freedom of the Press, 58 
the Supreme Court came down on the side of administrative con-
venience. The Court found that the FRA's legislative history 
"reveals that [its] purpose was not to benefit private parties, but 
solely to benefit the agencies themselves and the Federal Govern-
ment as a whole."59 The Court cited a Senate report stating that 
"records come into existence, or should do so, not ... to satisfy the 
archival needs of this and future generations, but first of all to serve 
the administrative and executive purposes of the organization that 
creates them."60 The FRA provision that requires "the establish-
ment of standards and procedures to assure efficient and effective 
records management"61 lends additional support to the analysis in 
Kissinger. 
Considering the fragmented nature of the FRA, however, the 
Kissinger Court's statement of the FR.A's primary purpose should 
be limited to the particular facts and FR.A provisions involved in 
that case. As the D.C. Circuit pointed out in American Friends Ser-
vice Committee v. Webster, 62 the Senate report relied upon in Kis-
singer accompanied the Federal Records Act of 1950,63 but many 
key FR.A provisions were enacted separately from the 1950 Act. 64 
For example, the 1950 Act did not include the FR.A's record dispo-
sal provisions, one of which broadly calls upon the Archivist to con-
sider "administrative, legal, research, or other value" in deciding 
which records to preserve.65 In addition, the Senate report cited in 
Kissinger did not claim that administrative efficiency was the sole 
purpose served by the FR.A but rather only the "first interest" 
among others.66 
58. 445 U.S. 136 (1980). 
59. 445 U.S. at 149. 
60. 445 U.S. at 149 (quoting S. REP. No. 2140, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950)). 
61. 44 u.s.c. § 2902 (1988). 
62. 720 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
63. Federal Records Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-754, § 6, 64 Stat. 578, 583-90 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 40, 41, 44, and 50 U.S.C.). 
64. American Friends, 720 F.2d at 53. Armstrong I amplifies this point by noting the 
enactment dates of the various parts of the FRA; for example, some disposal provisions were 
enacted as part of the 1943 Disposal of Records Act, Pub. L. No. 78-115, 57 Stat. 380 (codi-
fied as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3314 (1988)), and others were added in the Govern-
ment Records Disposal Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-287, 84 Stat. 320 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.). See Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 284 n.1 
(D.C. Cir. 1991). 
65. 44 U.S.C. § 3303a(a) (1988). The court in American Friends found it particularly sig-
nificant that the disposal provisions were not a part of the 1950 Act, because this provided a 
way to distinguish the wrongful destruction claim made in American Friends from the wrong-
ful removal claim made in Kissinger. See 720 F.2d at 40, 52. 
66. See American Friends, 720 F.2d at 53 (construing S. REP. No. 2140, 81st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 4 (1950)). Apart from Kissinger's limited analysis of the FRA's legislative history, that 
case also featured two peculiar elements that limit the reach of its reasoning about the FRA's 
purposes. Fust, the plaintiffs were seeking to establish an implied cause of action directly 
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Indeed, examination of the entirety of the FRA and its legisla-
tive history shows that it is clearly intended to serve the needs of 
historical preservation as well as administrative convenience. For 
example, the same section of the FRA that speaks of "efficient and 
effective records management" also mentions "[a]ccurate and com-
plete documentation of the policies and transactions of the Federal 
Government. "67 In addition, the court in American Friends under-
took a thorough study of the legislative history accompanying the 
various acts that comprise the FRA, and the court concluded that it 
"supports a finding that Congress intended, expected, and posi-
tively desired private researchers . . . to have access to the docu-
mentary history of the federal government."68 
More recent legislation enacted under the umbrella of the FRA 
manifests an even greater recognition of the need to preserve his-
torically significant agency information. In the National Archives 
and Records Administration Act of 1984,69 Congress transformed 
the National Archives and Records Service (NARS) from a branch 
of the General Services Administration (GSA) into an independent 
agency, designated as the National Archives and Records Adminis-
tration (NARA) and headed by the Archivist of the United 
States.70 The Act removed the Archivist, the National Archives 
that the Archivist manages, and all federal government recordkeep-
ing functions from the control of the GSA,11 based on a congres-
sional determination that the GSA is best suited to perform 
"housekeeping functions," as opposed to the "cultural activities" of 
the National Archives.12 Congress perceived that "[t]he mission of 
under the FRA, see Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 147-48, but the Supreme Court has been increas-
ingly reluctant to imply private causes of action under federal statutes that do not expressly 
authorize such suits, see, e.g., Karahalios v. National Fedn. ofFed. Employees Local 1263, 489 
U.S. 527, 536 (1989) (observing that the Court has "departed from its prior standard for 
resolving a claim urging that an implied statutory cause of action should be recognized"}; see 
also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 358 (2d ed. 1994) (finding a trend "for 
the Supreme Court to be less willing to create private rights of action"). Next, rather than 
alleging widespread or systematic agency violations of the FRA, the Kissinger plaintiffs com-
plained only that the State Department had not done enough to secure the return of the 
documents Henry Kissinger had allegedly wrongfully removed when he left the Department. 
See 445 U.S. at 148-51. Armstrong I later relied on this aspect of Kissinger to conclude that 
private-party claims of individual noncompliance with the FRA's provisions are not judicially 
cognizable. See Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 294-95. 
67. 44 U.S.C. § 2902 (1988); see also American Friends, 720 F.2d at 42 n.17, 53-55 (listing 
various other provisions that show that the FRA serves historical as well as administrative 
purposes). 
68. 720 F.2d at 55-57. 
69. Pub. L. No. 98-497, 98 Stat. 2280 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 44 
U.S.C.). 
70. 44 U.S.C. § 2102 (1988); S. REP. No. 373, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984), reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3865, 3866. 
71. S. REP. No. 373, supra note 70, at 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3866. 
72. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3870. The Senate report accompanying the 
Act described the GSA mission as "public buildings management and maintenance; federal 
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the National Archives - the storage, disposition, preservation, and 
use for further Government and private scholarly research of the 
records of enduring value of the United States Government ... -
is fundamentally incompatible with the mission of its parent agency, 
GSA."73 By freeing the NARA from GSA control, Congress in-
tended to create .a viable independent agency that could "ensure 
that our precious documentary heritage receives the care and atten-
tion demanded in a democracy."74 
This 1984 legislation clearly demonstrates congressional aware-
ness of the occasional conflict between historical preservation and 
administrative expediency, and it also reflects a desire to protect 
historical materials from claims of mere convenience. A Senate re-
port accompanying the Act illustrates the dangers of expediency by 
recounting and criticizing a series of record management decisions 
made during the period of GSA control over the National Archives 
that failed to recognize the need to preserve a historical record.75 
These incidents led the Senate report to conclude that "[w]ithout 
effective 'records management,' the Archivist. comes in after the 
fact to a situation where it may be too late to ensure a rich historical 
record."76 Seeking to prevent this situation, Congress transferred 
control over government record management from an agency that 
places highest priority on bureaucratic efficiency to an agency 
headed by a historian. In short, this recent legislation demonstrates 
that when the competing purposes served by the FRA come into 
conflict, the historical record must not be sacrificed for administra-
tive efficiency. 
property and services procurement and disposition; transportation; traffic; stockpiling of stra-
tegic materials; and management of the Government's data processing systems." Id. at 2, 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3866. 
73. Id. at 1-2, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.c.A.N. at 3865-66. The Senate report also quotes 
fonner Archivist James Rhoads's elaboration of this point: 
The central problem is that many of the objectives, priorities and motivations of 
GSA and NARS [the predecessor to NARA] are simply incompatible. There is no way 
that an agency dedicated to encouraging scholarly research and other educational and 
cultural objectives can function effectively as a subordinate component of a business-
oriented conglomerate whose primary responsibilities are for construction and mainte-
nance of public buildings, procurement of supplies, and management of motor pools and 
stockpiles of strategic materials. 
Id. at 6, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3870. 
74. Id. at 23, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3887. 
75. Id. at 6-17, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3870-81. For example, the Senate re-
port discusses in detail the 1974 agreement between President Nixon and the head of GSA 
that gave the fonner President broad powers to dispose of records created during his admin-
istration. Id. at 2, 11-12, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3866, 3875-76. By vesting record 
management powers in the head of GSA rather than the Archivist, the then-existing law had 
permitted a situation in which "the Archivist had not even been consulted while an arrange-
ment of major impact on our documentary history was worked out" Id. at 3, reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3867. 
76. Id. at 21, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3885. 
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· B. The Presidential Records Act 
1. The Procedures and Scope of the PRA 
In contrast to the FRA's regulation of agency recordkeeping, 
the PRA77 governs only the recordkeeping practices of the Presi-
dent and members of the presidential staff.78 The PRA provides 
general standards and procedures for the retention and disposal of 
presidential records, grants the incumbent President broad discre-
tion over day-to-day recordkeeping practices, and establishes a pro-
cess for eventual public disclosure of the materials a president has 
chosen to preserve. 
Like the FRA, the PRA establishes a record-based regulatory 
scheme. The PRA defines presidential records as "documentary 
materials,"79 which are in turn defined as "all books, correspon-
dence, memorandums, documents, papers, pamphlets, works of art, 
models, pictures, photographs, plats, maps, films, and motion pic-
tures, including, but not limited to, audio, audiovisual, or other 
electronic or mechanical recordations."80 Having established the 
broad sweep of documentary materials, the PRA then limits the 
scope of presidential records in various ways. Frrst, the definition of 
presidential records explicitly excludes "personal records."81 In ad-
dition, the PRA covers only records that are "created or received 
by the President, his immediate staff, or a unit or individual of the 
Executive Office of the President whose function is to advise and 
assist the President,'t and such records must have been created or 
received "in the course of conducting activities which relate to or 
have an effect upon the carrying out of" presidential duties.82 Fi-
nally, the statute's plain language shows that the records regulated 
under the PRA are mutually exclusive of those regulated under the 
FRA; the PRA definition of presidential records explicitly excludes 
documentary materials that are "official records of an agency,"83 
77. 44 u.s.c. §§ 2201-2207 (1988). 
78. See generally Bretscher, supra note 2, at 1481-87 (providing a detailed description of 
the background and provisions of the PRA). 
79. 44 u.s.c. § 2201(2) (1988). 
80. 44 u.s.c. § 2201(1) (1988). 
81. 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2)(B)(ii) (1988). The PRA defines personal records as "all docu-
mentary materials ... of a purely private or nonpublic character which do not relate to or 
have an effect upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or cere-
monial duties of the President." 44 U.S.C. § 2201(3) (1988). As examples of personal 
records, the PRA cites "diaries, journals, or other personal notes ••. which are not prepared 
or utilized for, or circulated or communicated in the course of, transacting Government busi-
ness," 44 U.S.C. § 2201(3)(A) (1988), and "materials relating to private political associa-
tions," 44 U.S.C. § 2201(3)(B) (1988). 
82. 44 u.s.c. § 2201(2) (1988). 
83. 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2)(B)(i) (1988). This section of the PRA cites the definition of 
agency provided by the FOIA at 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (1988). 
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while the FRA covers only agency records.84 Consequently, the 
FRA regulates White House records if they are created or received 
by a White House agency, but the PRA controls White House 
records created or received by the President or immediate presi-
dential staff as they carry out presidential duties. 
The PRA, however, lacks the FRA's executive enforcement 
scheme. Specifically, in contrast to the enforcement role dictated 
by the FRA, the Archivist plays only an advisory role in record 
management decisions made by an incumbent president under the 
PRA.85 While in office, a president makes the determination 
whether to dispose of records "that no longer have administrative, 
historical, informational, or evidentiary value."86 The Archivist 
may only offer a written opinion of the proposed disposal87 and, if 
desired, request the advice of Congress regarding the proposed dis-
posal. BB Regardless of whether the Archivist approves or disap-
proves of the President's disposal plans and regardless of whether 
the Archivist seeks the advi<;:e of Congress, the President may pro-
ceed with a planned disposal, having to wait at most sixty days so 
that Congress has a chance to respond.89 The PRA therefore lacks 
one of the FRA's key enforcement provisions: the Archivist may 
not initiate any sort of legal action against an incumbent president 
or presidential staff in order to prevent the improper disposal of 
presidential records.9° Finally, just as the FRA does not expressly 
provide for judicial review of agency recordkeeping,91 the PRA in-
cludes no provision for court oversight of an incumbent president's 
recordkeeping decisions,92 
Nevertheless, the PRA does provide the Archivist some control 
over the records of former presidents. Once a president leaves of-
fice, decisionmaking power over that president's records shifts to 
the Archivist, who then "assume[s] responsibility for the custody, 
control, and preservation of, and access to, the Presidential records 
of that President."93 The PRA circumscribes the Archivist's discre-
tion by dictating that public access to certain presidential records be 
84. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
85. See Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (describing the differences 
in the role of the Archivist under the FRA and the PRA). 
86. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c) (1988). 
'({!. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c)(l) (1988). 
88. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(e) (1988). 
89. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c)-(d) (1988). 
90. Recall that the FRA requires the Archivist to request that the Attorney General take 
action to prevent improper disposal of agency records if the agency head fails to do so. See 
supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
91. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
92. See Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 346 (D.D.C. 1989). 
93. 44 u.s.c. § 2203(£)(1) (1988). 
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restricted even after a president leaves· office.94 The PRA defines 
six categories of restricted records, including those with national de-
fense or foreign policy implications, confidential communications 
among presidential staff seeking or giving advice, and various files 
"the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted in-
vasion of personal privacy."95 Just prior to leaving office, a presi-
dent must specify a term of up to twelve years for each of the six 
restricted categories; during these terms, the Archivist must pro-
hibit public access to .the records in each of these categories.96 Af-
ter consulting with the former President, the Archivist determines 
whether records fall into one or more of the restricted categories 
and whether the PRA expressly exempts this determination from 
judicial review.97 Once the Archivist decides that a record fits into 
one of the restricted categories, that record may not be disclosed 
until the term of years specified for that category expires, until the 
former President waives the restriction, or until the Archivist deter-
mines that the former President has placed the record in the public 
domain through publication.98 Under the PRA, then, public access 
to presidential records may be delayed, but eventually the public 
may invoke the FOIA to gain access to all records that a president 
has seen fit to preserve while in office.99 
2. The Purposes of the PRA 
In contrast to the piecemeal enactment of the FRA and its at-
tendant conflicting purposes, Congress enacted the PRA as a single 
piece of legislation, and its straightforward provisions and legisla-
tive history reveal a pair of clearly articulated purposes. First, the 
PRA asserts public ownership of presidential records.100 Second, 
the PRA evinces a congressional intention that historically signifi-
cant presidential materials must be preserved, even at the price of 
some lost administrative recordkeeping convenience. The PRA di-
rects an incumbent president to consider a record's historical value 
94. 44 u.s.c. § 2204 (1988). 
95. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a) (1988). 
96. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a) (1988). 
97. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(b)(3) (1988). The PRA is otherwise almost completely silent on 
judicial review. The statute does not expressly provide for judicial review of an incumbent 
president's recordkeeping decisions, see supra note 92 and accompanying text, but does per-
mit a former president to initiate a suit "asserting that a determination made by the Archivist 
violates the former President's rights or privileges," 44 U.S.C. § 2204(e) (1988). Finally, a 
court may review an archivist's decision to dispose of a former president's records. See 44 
u.s.c. § 2203(f)(3) (1988). 
98. 44 u.s.c. § 2204(b)(l) (1988). 
99. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(c)(l) (1988). 
100. 44 U.S.C. § 2202 (1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 2, reprinted In 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5733. 
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when making disposal decisions.101 Moreover, the House report ac-
companying the PRA states that the legislation assures "the preser-
vation of the historical record of future Presidencies"102 and that 
one of the main purposes of the PRA is "to establish procedures 
governing the preservation and public availability of [presidential] 
records. "103 Even when the House report acknowledges the effi-
ciency motive for recordkeeping procedures, it argues for careful 
preservation of records, noting that presidential administrations are 
sometimes handicapped by lack of availability of records from prior 
administrations.104 
Furthermore, the legislative history emphasizes that the PRA's 
restrictive provisions - those that limit the definition of presiden-
tial records and delay public access to those records - should work 
to enhance rather than to diminish the historical record. First, Con-
gress indicated that the "personal records" exception to the defini-
tion of presidential records is narrow; the House report states that 
"a great number of what might ordinarily be construed as one's pri-
vate activities are, because of the nature of the presidency, consid-
ered to be of a public nature."105 Next, the House report explains 
that the Archivist, rather than the outgoing President, is given the 
power to determine whether records lie within the PRA categories 
of delayed public access106 so that an outgoing president may not 
arbitrarily invoke these restrictions to thwart the public interest.107 
Finally, even while acknowledging the "chilling effect" on free ex-
101. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c) (1988). 
102. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5733. 
103. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5733. 
104. Id. at 8 n.12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5739 (citing NATIONAL STUDY 
CoMMN. ON RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS OF FED. OFFICIALS, MEMORANDUM OF FINDINGS 
ON EXISTING CUSTOM OR LAw, FACT AND OPINION 39 (1977)); see also id. at 4, reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5735 (noting that materials from former presidents to which public 
access has been restricted are available to the incumbent President when "necessary to con-
duct the ongoing business of Government"). 
105. Id. at 11-12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5742-43. 
106. See supra note 97 and accompanying text; see also H.R. REP. No.1487, supra note 4, 
at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5734 (noting that the outgoing President's options are 
limited to deciding whether each of the six restrictive categories should be invoked at all and 
deciding what terms of years should apply to the chosen restrictive categories). 
107. As the House report states: 
Some form of statutory access provisions, rather than leaving the choice entirely up 
to the former President, was considered necessary to shield the ~rchivist from unneces-
sary pressure. The Archivist, it was felt, would be susceptible to possible pressure from 
the incumbent President to release embarrassing and inappropriate material concerning 
a predecessor or rival, and from the predecessor to withhold materials when no sound 
policy reason for doing so would be evident The unlimited right to restrict access would 
also allow the outgoing President to close availability entirely during a set period; to 
permit trusted researchers to view the materials to the exclusion of others; and set 
mandatory restrictions which would be akin to assertions of privilege over the materials 
against the public. 
H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 8-9, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5739-40. 
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change among White House staff members that might result from 
premature disclosure of presidential records,1os the House report 
reveals a clear commitment to the preservation of history, stating 
that a great danger of premature disclosure would be "less candid 
advice being placed on paper [resulting in] a depleted historical rec-
ord."109 In short, Congress intended that the PRA should princi-
pally serve the needs of historical preservation. 
C. The Freedom of Information Act 
In contrast to the FRA and the PRA, which dictate record man-
agement policies and procedures, the FQJAllO regulates only the 
public disclosure of government records.111 Accordingly, the FOIA 
defines procedures for disclosure of records and enumerates spe-
cific exemptions that the government may invoke to prevent 
disclosure. 
The FOIA's procedures for disclosure of government informa-
tion encompass both agency and presidential records. First, like the 
FRA,. the FOIA explicitly governs "agency records,"112 although 
the FOIA does not define records,113 and only a 1974 amendment 
defines the term agency.114 Next, the PRA widens the scope of 
records available for disclosure through the FOIA by stipulating 
that the FOIA governs access to presidential records once the 
PRA's restriction period has expired.115 
The FOIA specifies the scope of materials that agencies must 
make available to the public. Ftrst, the FOIA provides that an 
agency must disclose certain basic information, such as a descrip-
tion of its organization and statements of policy, regardless of 
whether anyone has requested it.116 Next, the FOIA requires agen-
108. Id. at 8, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5739. 
109. Id. at 14-15, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5746. 
110. 5 u.s.c. § 552 (1988). 
111. See Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 345 (D.D.C. 1989) ("FOIA ••. is a disclo-
sure statute, and a disclosure statute only; it imposes no obligations and provides no guidance 
for the creation or disposal of particular records."). 
112. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988) (providing that "each agency, upon any request 
for records ..• shall make the records promptly available"). 
113. See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 183 (1980) (noting that the FOIA does not 
define record, and choosing to apply the FRA definition). 
114. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1564 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)); see 
also H.R. REP. No. 876, supra note 29, at 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6274 (discuss-
ing the 1974 amendment to the FOIA that explicitly defines agency to include, among other 
entities, establishments within the Executive Office of the President). 
115. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Without this express PRA provision, 
presidential records arguably would be outside the reach of the FOIA, because by statutory 
definition presidential records are distinct from agency records. See supra note 83 and accom-
panying text. 
116. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l)-(2) (1988). 
February 1995] Note - White House Electronic Mail 811 
cies to make their records available to any person upon request un-
less one of nine exemptions from disclosure applies.111 Some of 
these exemptions are comparable to the restrictions the PRA places 
on materials of an outgoing president to delay public access;11s for 
example, the PRA and the FOIA share exemptions from disclosure 
for materials relating to national defense and for personnel and 
medical files.119 The FOIA exemption from disclosure for "inter-
agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters"120 differs, how-
ever, from the PRA restriction covering "confidential communica-
tions requesting or submitting advice."121 Whereas courts have 
held that the FOIA exemption applies only until the agency deci-
sion discussed in the "memorandums or letters" has been made,122 
Congress intended the PRA restriction to apply throughout the pe-
riod of restriction specified by the outgoing President.123 The 
FOIA exemptions also differ from the PRA restrictions in a more 
fundamental way. The PRA restrictions leave no room for discre-
tion, but they only delay public access.124 In contrast, the FOIA 
gives agencies discretion to decide whether to invoke exemp-
tions, 125 but it places no limit on the length of time exempt materi-
als may be withheld from the public.126 
By submitting FOIA requests for disclosure of government in-
formation, private individuals "enforce" the FOIA; the statute pro-
vides no executive enforcement scheme. In addition, the FOIA 
explicitly provides for judicial review: courts may review an 
agency's decision not to comply with a FOIA request,127 and they 
may also review an agency's failure to respond to a FOIA request 
in a timely fashion.128 
The legislative history of an amendment to the FOIA clearly 
expresses the FOIA's purpose: guaranteeing "the right of persons 
117. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988). 
118. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. 
119. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l) (1988) (FOIA national defense exemption) and 5 
U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988) (FOIA personnel and medical file exemption) with 44 U.S.C. 
§ 2204(a)(l) (1988) (PRA national defense restriction) and 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a)(6) (1988) 
(PRA personnel and medical file restriction). 
120. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(5) (1988). 
121. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a)(5) (1988). 
122. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421U.S.132, 150-54 (1975) (distinguishing 
between predecisional and postdecisional agency documents); Access Reports v. Department 
of Justice, 926 F.2d 1192, 1194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (surveying judicial interpretations of the 
"deliberative process" exemption). 
123. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5745. 
124. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text. 
125. See Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 678 F.2d 315, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
126. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b) (1988). 
127. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4){B) (1988). 
128. See 5 U.S.C. § 552{a)(6)(C) {1988). 
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to know about the business of their government."129 Many provi-
sions of the FOIA support this goal. First, in court proceedings that 
follow an agency's denial of a FOIA request, the agency bears the 
burden of proving that one of the exemptions applies.130 Next, the 
FOIA imposes strict limits on the amount of time agencies have to 
respond to requests.131 In addition, the FOIA explicitly limits the 
reasons for withholding information to the statute's nine exemp-
tions.132 The FOIA therefore stands for the ideal that free flow of 
information from the government to the citizenry is crucial to a 
well-functioning democracy.133 
D. Reconciling the Purposes of Recordkeeping and Record 
Disclosure Law 
The three statutes examined in this Part were enacted sepa-
rately, and they arguably reflect different congressional concerns 
and priorities. Moreover, the FR.A alone consists of distinct enact-
ments that seem to serve conflicting purposes.134 Although this 
Part has thus far argued that the language, structure, and history of 
each individual statute evince a congressional intent to emphasize 
the preservation of historical records, this section argues in addition 
that courts should read these statutes together and thereby inter-
pret federal recordkeeping law as a unified whole that mandates the 
preservation of a historical record of government policymaking. 
Several arguments support judicial reference to the broad his-
torical preservation mandate of the PRA as a way of helping to 
reconcile the conflicting purposes of the FRA. First, courts some-
times resolve statutory ambiguities by consulting related statutes 
that provide straightforward solutions to the problem at hand;13s 
129. H.R. REP. No. fr76, supra note 29, at 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6269. 
130. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988). 
131. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (1988). 
132. 5 U.S.C. § 552(d) (1988). 
133. The House and Senate Select Committees that investigated the Iran-Contra affair 
echoed this ideal in their joint report: 
Officials who make public policy must be accountable to the public. But the public 
cannot hold officials accountable for policies of which the public is unaware. Policies 
that are known can be subjected to the test of reason, and mistakes can be corrected 
after consultation with the Congress and deliberation within the Executive branch itself. 
Policies that are secret become the private preserve of the few, mistakes are inevitably 
perpetuated, and the public loses control over Government. That is what happened in 
the Iran-Contra Affair ••.• 
H.R. REP. No. 433, supra note 1, at 16. Compare New York Tunes Co. v. United States, 403 
U.S. 713, 720-24 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring), in which Justice Douglas, arguing that pub-
lication of the Pentagon Papers should not be enjoined, stated: "Secrecy in government is 
fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors. Open debate and discus-
sion of public issues are vital to our national health." 403 U.S. at 724. 
134. See supra notes 56-76 and accompanying text. 
135. See, e.g., Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 183 (1980) (looking to the FRA definition 
of records to resolve the ambiguity left by the FOIA's failure to define agency records). See 
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clearly the PRA and the FRA concern the same subject matter, 
federal recordkeeping. Second, because the PRA was enacted 
more recently than most of the FRA's provisions, it can be seen as 
part of an evolving congressional recognition that administrative ef-
ficiency must ultimately yield to the preservation of government 
history.136 Accordingly, some of the older legislative history of the 
FRA that places greater emphasis on achp.inistrative convenience 
can perhaps be given less weight because it is based on outdated 
congressional concerns. 
Additionally, interpreting the FRA to require a lesser historical 
preservation burden than that imposed by the PRA leads to the 
anomalous result that two distinct recordkeeping mandates apply 
within the White House itself - depending on whether a given rec-
ord is presidential or is instead traceable to an agency.131 Such a 
result would be needlessly confusing, particularly because the lan-
guage of the two statutes is similar enough to support a unified 
mandate.138 Moreover, this result would imply that presidential 
staff must be held to a stricter standard of preservation than that 
required of agency officials, based solely on a clearer congressional 
statement of the supremacy of the goal of historical preservation in 
the PRA's legislative history.139 But a claim that presidential 
records have greater historical significance than agency records ig-
nores substantial public interest in the roles agencies might have 
played at key moments in the nation's history.140 Finally, given the 
generally 2A NoRMAN J. SINGER, SuntERLAND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION §§ 51.01-03 (4th 
ed. 1984) (describing the general rules for construing related statutes). 
136. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text (describing the trend toward preserva-
tion of history in more recent FRA legislation); cf. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commn., 626 F.2d 1020, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that a "latter law" 
implicitly restricts an inconsistent earlier statute); 2A SINGER, supra note 135, § 51.02 ("If 
there is an irreconcilable conflict between the new provision and the prior statutes, the new 
provision will control as it is the later expression of the legislature."). 
137. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (noting that the FRA governs some 
White House recordkeeping practices while the PRA controls others). 
138. Compare supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (describing the FRA definition 
of records) with supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (describing the PRA definition). 
Indeed, the House report accompanying the PRA explicitly states an intention that the PRA 
and the FRA be uniformly applied: "[I]t was felt important that once having declared the 
President's papers to be Government records, they be governed to the extent feasible by the 
same statutory standards controlling Cabinet members' records and all other Government 
records. Consistency in application of the rules seemed critical." H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra 
note 4, at 8, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5739. 
139. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text 
140. See, e.g., American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 54 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) (noting congressional interest in FBI records that might be relevant to assassination 
investigations). 
Furthermore, the facts surrounding the Armstrong litigation refute any claim that agency 
records should be subject to a lesser standard of preservation than presidential records, be-
cause a major question in the Iran-Contra affair was whether questionable policies were for-
mulated by agency officials or by the President himself. See Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 
343, 345 n.1 (D.D.C. 1989). Indeed, regardless of what the President knew about the extent 
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unique separation of powers issues raised by legislation that regu-
lates presidential activities,141 Congress could hardly have intended 
that the President should meet a higher or more burdensome re-
cordkeeping standard than federal agencies. In short, many argu-
ments support interpreting the FRA in light of the PRA's broad 
mandate to preserve historical materials, particularly in cases in 
which White House recordkeeping responsibilities are at issue. 
In addition to clarifying the FRA, there are other reasons courts 
should examine the FRA, the PRA, and the FOIA together to ar-
rive at a unified and coherent statement of federal recordkeeping 
policy under current law. For example, courts can apply a key prin-
ciple of the FOIA - namely, public disclosure of records pertain-
ing to government decisionmaking142 - to impose a duty that the 
government retain at least some records that will eventually be sub-
ject to disclosure under the FOIA.143 Courts can also resolve any 
conflicts based upon differing qr nonexistent definitions of records 
by considering the broad purposes served by all three statutes 
viewed as a whole.144 A global strategy for interpreting federal re-
cordkeeping and record disclosure law would thus ensure more 
consistent treatment of records, whether agency or presidential, and 
would also ensure that courts apply only standards chosen by Con-
of the NSC's Iran-Contra activities, historians and the public would certainly want to learn 
about those activities at some point. Cf. KoH, supra note 1, at 53-57 {describing the NSC's 
increasing role in policymaking, which culminated in that agency's pivotal role in the Iran-
Contra scandal). Notwithstanding this equal importance of presidential and agency records, 
however, the Armstrong courts have not yet used the PRA's clearer statement of purposes as 
an aid to construction of the FRA. 
141. See Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1991) {distinguishing the FRA 
from the PRA by noting that "[i]n drafting the FRA, Congress did not have to worry about 
the stark separation of powers questions implicated by legislation regulating the conduct of 
the President's daily operations"). Separation of powers concerns are also discussed infra in 
notes 223-46 and accompanying text. 
142. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text. 
143. Justice Brennan suggested this approach in Kissinger: 
If FOIA is to be more than a dead letter, it must necessarily incorporate some restraint 
upon the agency's power to move documents beyond the reach of the FOIA requester. 
Even the Court's opinion implies - as I think it must - that an agency would be im-
properly withholding documents if it failed to take steps to recover papers removed from 
its custody deliberately to evade an FOIA request. Beyond that minimal rule, I would 
think it also plainly unacceptable for an agency to devise a records routing system aimed 
at frustrating FOIA requests in general by moving documents outside agency custody 
with unseemly haste. 
Indeed, I would go further. If the purpose of FOIA is to provide public access to the 
records incorporated into Government decisionmaking, then agencies may well have a 
concomitant responsibility to retain possession of, or control over, those records. 
Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 159 {1980) (Brennan, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted); see also Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 
161-65 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explicitly adopting this ap-
proach); American Friends, 720 F.2d at 42 n.16 (construing Justice Brennan's opinion in 
Kissinger). 
144. See infra notes 249-72 and accompanying text (arguing that despite differences in 
language, all three statutes support a functional definition of records). 
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gress, regardless of which particular statute enunciates the 
standard.145 
II. ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL RECORDKEEPING LAW 
As Part I demonstrated, the FRA, the PRA, and the FOIA to-
gether create a complex statutory scheme for regulating federal 
government information management and disclosure. Because the 
government cannot disclose information it has not retained, its re-
cordkeeping and record disclosure duties are clearly intertwined; 
nonetheless, separate statutes control these related responsibili-
ties.146 Similarly, even though White House agency and presidential 
staff may share communications facilities, recordkeeping systems, 
and a common mission of presidential policymaking, the federal 
statutory scheme distinguishes between agency and presidential 
records within the White House.147 Given this complex scheme, it 
is no simple matter to ensure White House compliance with record-
keeping law or even to determine the precise contours of White 
House recordkeeping responsibilities. 
This Part examines the enforcement of White House record-
keeping responsibilities. First, this Part considers the extent to 
which private parties may bring suit alleging that the government 
has failed to meet its recordkeeping responsibilities.148 In particu-
lar, because neither the PRA nor the FRA explicitly provide for 
145. Of course, Congress could also address this problem by enacting unified recordkeep-
ing legislation that eliminates the distinction between agency and presidential records, and by 
explicitly reconciling the duties under this unified legislation with government record disclo-
sure responsibilities under the FOIA. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Electronic Records Manage-
ment and Archives, 53 U. Pm. L REv. 963, 995 (1992) ("The absence of explicit linkage 
between the FOIA and records statutes creates problems for sound records management."). 
It must be conceded that the unified approach described in the text would not have sub-
stantially changed the results thus far in the Armstrong litigation. First, the court in Arm-
strong I found a limited power of judicial review of FRA duties without needing to appeal to 
the agency's ultimate duty to disclose information. See 924 F.2d at 291-96. In addition, 
although the court found no power to review individual compliance with the FRA, see 924 
F .2d at 294-95, no language in either the PRA or the FOIA clearly supports a different result. 
Next, a court could not plausibly carry over the implied power of judicial review from the 
FRA to the PRA, especially in light of the clear and intentional differences between the FRA 
and the PRA. See infra note 161 and accompanying text. Fmally, it would do little good to 
review the Archivist's actions with respect to an incumbent president, because the PRA ex-
plicitly limits the Archivist to an advisory rather than an enforcement role in the President's 
recordkeeping decisions. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text. As the Armstrong 
litigation moves to scrutiny of White House recordkeeping guidelines, however, a unified 
approach may aid evaluation of those guidelines. See infra section III.B (proposing guide-
lines for management of White House electronic mail). 
146. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
147. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
148. Because the FOIA explicitly provides for judicial review of agency refusals to dis-
close information, see supra note 127 and accompanying text, this Part considers only judicial 
review of government recordkeeping pursuant to the FRA and the PRA. 
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judicial review by way of private suit, 149 a court must decide 
whether, and to what extent, either of those statutes permit such 
review by implication. Section II.A surveys cases that have consid-
ered the availability and extent of judicial review of PRA and FRA 
compliance and finds that court rulings have generally reflected the 
statutory scheme's sharp distinction between agency and presiden-
tial records - namely, courts have found that agency recordkeep-
ing practices are reviewable but presidential practices are not. 
Section II.B then argues that Congress should amend recordkeep-
ing law to provide more comprehensive enforcement roles and judi-
cial review. The existing combination of severely limited judicial 
review and the PRA's broad grant of discretion to the incumbent 
presidential staff to decide which records to retain1so leaves histori-
cally valuable presidential materials acutely vulnerable to irrespon-
sible recordkeeping in contravention of the mandate established by 
federal recordkeeping law. This Part concludes that Congress can 
address these problems without offending separation of powers 
principles. 
A. The Private Right To Seek Judicial Enforcement of 
Recordkeeping Duties 
A court that is presented with a private-party claim of govern-
ment recordkeeping violations must address two issues. First and 
foremost, given that Congress did not expressly empower courts to 
review government compliance with the terms of the PRA or the 
FRA, a court must determine whether Congress nonetheless in-
tended that judicial review be available. Assuming such a congres-
sional intention exists, the court must then decide which particular 
statutory provisions give rise to reviewable duties.1s1 This section 
149. See supra notes 55, 92 and accompanying text. 
150. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. 
151. The court must also determine whether the private plaintiff has standing to cha!· 
lenge government recordkeeping practices. Both American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 
720 F.2d 29, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983), and Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1991), 
hold that private researchers and historians satisfy the "zone of interests" standing test. This 
test requires a court to "discern whether the interest asserted by a party in the particular 
instance is one intended by Congress to be protected or regulated by the statute under which 
the suit is brought." Control Data Corp. v. Baldrige, 655 F.2d 283, 293-94 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 
see also American Friends, 720 F.2d at 49-52 (reviewing the history and content of the "zone 
of interests" test). 
The American Friends court found that both the language and the legislative history of 
the FRA show a clear congressional intent to benefit researchers and historians by preserving 
a documentary history of government. 720 F.2d at 53-57. For example, the court cited both 
the FRA provision that calls for consideration of a record's research value prior to its dispo-
sal, 720 F.2d at 53-54 (citing 44 U.S.C. § 3303a(a) (1988)), and a statement in the FRA's 
legislative history that a 1978 amendment was intended to simplify researcher access to gov-
ernment records, 720 F.2d at 56 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1522, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2288, 2289). Fmally, the court supported its holding that re-
searchers have standing to challenge improper record disposals by observing "the simple, 
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considers the viability of judicial enforcement of recordkeeping law 
at the behest of private parties by surveying cases that have deter-
mined the availability and extent of judicial review of recordkeep-
ing duties. 
In particular, the Armstrong decisions have established the pre-
cise scope of judicial review under the FRA and the PRA. Courts 
may consider whether agency recordkeeping guidelines and direc-
tives meet the mandate of the FRA. In addition, although courts 
may not entertain private-party actions alleging that an individual 
agency official is violating recordkeeping guidelines, they may re-
view the failure of the Archivist or an agency head to initiate an 
enforcement action against such an agency official. Finally, 
although the PRA generally precludes judicial review of presiden-
tial recordkeeping practices, a court may review whether White 
House guidelines properly classify records as presidential. 
1. The Lack of a Private Cause of Action Under the PRA and 
the FRA 
Neither the FRA nor the PRA explicitly allows a private plain-
tiff to seek judicial review of government recordkeeping prac-
tices.152 Furthermore, although courts may find an implied power 
of review based on congressional intent,153 the courts have found 
that neither the FRA nor the PRA evinces an intent to permit pri-
vate suits. First, in Kissinger v. Reponers Committee for Freedom of 
practical fact that government records can only be accepted by the Archives, where they may 
be made available to the public, if the agency that creates them has not destroyed them first." 
720 F.2d at 55. 
Perhaps because the PRA explicitly calls for consideration of a presidential record's his-
torical value prior to its disposal, 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c) (1988), the Armstrong I court had no 
trouble extending the result in American Friends to cover both the FRA and the PRA. Ann-
strong I, 924 F.2d at 287-88. The government argued that American Friends had only estab-
lished that private researchers and historians were within the "zone of interests" of the 
FRA's disposal provisions, not its record management provisions. 924 F.2d at 288. The court, 
however, found such a distinction untenable; whether an agency official deletes an e-mail 
message because he disregards the FRA's disposal provisions or because he believes it fails 
to qualify as a record, his action results in a message "lost forever to history." 924 F.2d at 
288. The court concluded that private researchers and historians have standing to challenge 
an alleged failure to comply with either PRA or FRA recordkeeping provisions. 924 F.2d at 
288. 
Taken together, these decisions on the issue of standing clearly show that one of the 
purposes of both the PRA and the FRA is "to ensure that private researchers and historians 
••• have access to the documentary history of the federal government." Armstrong I, 924 
F.2d at 287. These rulings therefore support the claim that federal recordkeeping law should 
principally serve the needs of history. See supra section I.D. 
152. Recall that the FRA authorizes the Attorney General to bring an action to prevent 
the wrongful destruction of records. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. This 
section of this Note is concerned only with private causes of action. 
153. See generally Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) 
(discussing the factors to be considered when determining whether Congress intended judi-
cial review to be available under a statute). 
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the Press, 154 the Supreme Court declined to imply a private right of 
action from the terms and legislative history of the FRA,155 Be-
cause the FRA provides only administrative enforcement mecha-
nisms and because the Court interpreted the FRA's legislative 
history to support a congressional preference for administrative 
mechanisms, Kissinger concluded that the FRA does not demon-
strate the requisite congressional intent to permit judicial review.156 
In Armstrong 1,151 the D.C. Circuit similarly concluded that the 
PRA does not provide an implied private cause of action to review 
presidential recordkeeping.15s Ironically, the court relied on the 
absence of administrative enforcement mechanisms in the PRA to 
conclude that Congress did not intend to permit judicial review of 
presidential recordkeeping practices or decisions, 159 The court 
noted that the PRA grants the incumbent President great discretion 
in making record disposal decisions160 and saw this discretion as an 
indication of congressional concern that extensive oversight of pres-
idential recordkeeping - whether by the Archivist, Congress, or 
the courts - would unduly encroach upon the President's day-to-
day operations, thereby upsetting the balance of power ·among 
branches of govemment.161 Thus Kissinger and Armstrong I fore-
-close the possibility of judicial review implied directly from the 
terms of either the FRA or the PRA. 
2. The Availability and Extent of Judicial Review Under the APA 
Despite the absence of an express or implied cause of action 
under the FRA or the PRA, limited judicial review is nonetheless 
available to a private plaintiff under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA).162 The APA provides for judicial review of the action 
of an administrative agency unless a statute clearly precludes such 
154. 445 U.S. 136 {1980). 
155. 445 U.S. at 148-50. 
156. 445 U.S. at 147-50. The Court reasoned that "regardless of whether Kissinger has 
violated the [FRA], Congress has not vested federal courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate 
that question upon suit by a private party. That responsibility is vested in the administrative 
authorities." 445 U.S. at 149-50. 
157. Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
158. 924 F.2d at 291. 
159. 924 F.2d at 290-91. 
160. 924 F.2d at 290; see also supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. 
161. 924 F.2d at 290-91 ("Congress was ... keenly aware of the separation of powers 
concerns that were implicated by legislation regulating the conduct of the President's daily 
operations."). 
162. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 3105, 3344 (1988). The Kissinger Court explicitly left 
open the possibility of review under the APA: "We need not decide what remedies might be 
available to private plaintiffs complaining that the administrators and the Attorney General 
have breached a duty to enforce the [FRA], since no such action was brought here." Kis-
singer v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150 n5 (1980). 
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review or the action is left to the agency's discretion.163 Moreover, 
the APA generally creates a presumption in favor of the availability 
of judicial review of agency actions, even if the statute that defines 
agency duties is silent on the subject of court review.164 Accord-
ingly, in American Friends Service Committee v. Webster,165 the 
D.C. Circuit held that the APA did indeed permit judicial review of 
the compliance of the FBI and the National Archives and Records 
Service (NARS)166 with the record disposal provisions of the 
FRA.167 The court found that record disposal issues are appropri-
ate for judicial review, in part because the FRA provides specific 
criteria for record retention that agencies and the NARS are bound 
to follow.168 The American Friends court also offered a pragmatic 
argument in favor of judicial review, reasoning that judicial over-
sight would counteract the tendency of agencies to exercise their 
"built-in incentive to dispose of records relating to 'mistakes.' "169 
163. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1988) (prohibiting judicial review where "statutes preclude 
judicial review" or where "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law"); 5 U.S.C. 
§ 702 (1988) ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected 
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial 
review thereof."}; see also Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 349 (D.D.C. 1989} (consider-
ing the availability of judicial review under the APA when no private cause of action can be 
implied directly from the PRA or the FRA); Bretscher, supra note 2, at 1491-93 (discussing 
judicial review under the APA). 
164. See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (holding that "only upon a 
showing of 'clear and convincing' evidence of a contrary legislative intent should courts re-
strict access to judicial review"). But see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-33 (1985) 
(finding that judicial review is presumptively unavailable in the context of an agency refusal 
to take enforcement action). 
165. 720 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
166. At the time of American Friends, the NARS was still a component of the General 
Services Administration (GSA}. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text. Because the 
NARS was part of a federal agency (the GSA}, its actions were potentially subject to judicial 
review under the APA. 720 F.2d at 38-45. 
167. 720 F.2d at 38-45. The fact situations in American Friends and in Armstrong are 
similar. The American Friends plaintiffs claimed that the FBI and the NARS had failed to 
carry out their statutory duties to manage and properly dispose of records. 720 F.2d at 35. 
Protracted litigation followed, resulting in the FBI and the NARS developing new record 
retention plans and disposal schedules. 720 F.2d at 35-36. 
168. 720 F.2d at 42-43, 45. The court reconciled its holding with Kissinger's refusal to 
permit judicial review by noting that Kissinger explicitly leaves unanswered the question of 
judicial review under the APA and by distinguishing Kissinger's allegations of improper re-
moval of records from allegations that the agencies were destroying records in violation of 
the FRA. 720 F.2d at 40-41. The court also found that judicial oversight would not under-
mine the ability of the FBI and the NARS to carry out their core functions and that the 
congressional oversight role provided by the FRA was an inadequate substitute for judicial 
review. 720 F.2d at 44-45. 
169. 720 F.2d at 41. The court emphasized the self-policing difficulty that would result if 
judicial review were not available: 
In a situation where GSA and the FBI (part of the Justice Department) are the allegedly 
guilty parties that have agreed to the destruction of the records, it is highly unlikely that 
Congress intended the exclusive remedy to be a Justice Department suit to recover the 
records (and to have the remedy triggered by FBI or GSA notification of improper 
records removal). 
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Having determined that the APA authorizes judicial review of 
agency and archivist compliance with the FRA, a court must next 
decide precisely which agency and archivist duties are subject to 
review.17° Broadly speaking, the FRA defines three recordkeeping 
roles.171 First, each individual agency official must comply with re-
cordkeeping law and agency guidelines. Next, if an individual fails 
to comply, the agency head and the Archivist assume special en-
forcement roles. Fmally, the agencies and the Archivist must work 
together to formulate recordkeeping guidelines. 
In Armstrong 1,112 the D.C. Circuit held that the individual re-
cordkeeping role is not subject to judicial review under the APA.173 
Despite the FRA's explicit command that no agency records may 
be "alienated or destroyed" except in accordance with its provi-
sions,174 the court invoked Kissinger's reasoning11s to find that Con-
gress did not intend to supplement the FRA's administrative 
enforcement mechanisms with private suits.176 Instead, the court 
concluded that Congress left the task of ensuring individual compli-
ance with agency recordkeeping guidelines to the Archivist and the 
agency head.111 
720 F.2.d at 41. Congress addressed this FRA weakness in a 1984 amendment that requires 
the Archivist to request the Attorney General to initiate an action to prevent wrongful re-
moval of records when an agency head fails to do so. 44 U.S.C. § 2905(a) {1988). In the 
legislative history of this amendment, Congress noted "the anomalous situation created by 
current [pre-1984] law whereby an agency head has a duty to initiate action to recover 
records which he himself has removed." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1124, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3894, 3903; see also Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 
292 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (rejecting the government's argument that the 1984 FRA amendments 
showed congressional intent to preclude judicial review by opting instead to strengthen ad-
ministrative enforcement mechanisms). 
170. The APA provides two mechanisms for shielding particular agency actions from re-
view. First, an agency can overcome the general presumption that judicial review of an 
agency action is available by showing that Congress intended to preclude such review; such a 
showing typically involves a claim that the statutory scheme governing the agency action 
leaves no room for judicial oversight. See American Friends, 720 F.2d at 39. Second, because 
the APA states that courts may not review actions that are "committed to agency discretion 
by law," 5 U.S.C. § 70l{a){2) {1988) courts determining the extent of judicial review must 
find that an agency's duties are defined with sufficient precision to permit a judgment on 
whether the agency properly carried out those duties. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 
830 {1985) (construing APA§ 701(a)(2) and finding that "even where Congress has not af-
firmatively precluded review, review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court 
would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discre-
tion"); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) {formu-
lating the "law to apply" test, under which judicial review of an agency action is unavailable 
where a statute only broadly defines the agency's role). 
171. See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text (describing the duties the FRA im-
poses on individuals, agencies, and the Archivist). 
172. Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
173. 924 F.2d at 294-95. 
174. 44 u.s.c. § 3314 {1988). 
175. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text. 
176. 924 F.2d at 294-95. 
177. 924 F.2d at 294. 
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In contrast, Armstrong I holds that courts may consider whether 
the Archivist and agency heads have properly performed their FRA 
enforcement duties.178 Having just found that record destruction 
by individuals can only be halted by the Archivist and the agency 
head acting in their enforcement roles, the Armstrong I court recog-
nized that judicial review constitutes the last line of defense in the 
event that neither the Archivist nor the agency head takes enforce-
ment action.119 Moreover, because the FRA includes provisions 
that require the Archivist and the agency head to take enforcement 
steps,18o the court reasoned that initiation of an enforcement action 
involves no exercise of discretion by the Archivist or the agency 
head.181 The court concluded that the APA permits judicial review 
of the enforcement roles defined by the FRA.182 
Next, the D.C. Circuit ruled in Armstrong I that courts may con-
sider whether agency recordkeeping guidelines and directives meet 
the mandate of the FRA.183 Contrasting the PRA's "stark separa-
tion of powers questions" - and the resulting congressional intent 
"to minimize outside interference with the President's recordkeep-
ing practices" - with the FRA's "more detailed and comprehen-
sive agency recordkeeping provisions,"184 the court found that 
Congress did not intend to preclude review of the adequacy of an 
agency's recordkeeping guidelines.185 Instead, the court held that 
"the FRA reflects a congressional intent to ensure that agencies ad-
equately document their policies and decisions"186 and that judicial 
review of guidelines would not frustrate this intent.187 The court 
also determined that development of recordkeeping guidelines is 
not left to agency discretion; just as the FRA defines clear enforce-
ment duties, the statute also specifically requires each agency head 
to develop recordkeeping guidelines and procedures in cooperation 
with the Archivist.188 Finally, the court found that the FRA's de-
178. 924 F.2d at 296. 
179. 924 F.2d at 295. The need for judicial review is underscored by the fact that neither 
an archivist nor an agency head has ever invoked the FRA's provisions that require the 
initiation of action through the Attorney General if necessary to block improper destruction 
of records. Moreover, the court's pragmatic assessment of the dire consequences of a com-
plete lack of judicial review of the FRA's enforcement roles evokes Justice Brennan's similar 
concern with Kissinger's conclusion that judicial review of improper record removal cannot 
be implied from either the FRA or the FOIA. See supra note 143. 
180. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. 
181. 924 F.2d at 295-96. 
182. 924 F.2d at 296. 
183. 924 F.2d at 291-94. 
184. 924 F.2d at 292. 
185. 924 F.2d at 292-93. 
186. 924 F.2d at 292. 
187. 924 F.2d at 292-93. 
188. 924 F.2d at 293. 
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tailed specification of the types of records agencies must retain en-
ables courts to evaluate the adequacy of agency recordkeeping 
guidelines and directives.1s9 
Turning to the PRA, however, the Armstrong I court ruled that 
the APA does not provide a mechanism for judicial review of presi-
dential recordkeeping practices.190 Because the APA only autho-
rizes review of agency actions, 191 the court first had to consider 
whether the President could be considered an agency. The court 
recognized that the APA does not explicitly exclude the President 
from its definition of agency and that some earlier cases had sug-
gested in dicta that the President is an agency. 192 The court never-
theless concluded that congressional silence on the issue, as 
demonstrated in the APA's language and legislative history, should 
not be construed as granting power to review presidential actions, 
particularly given the separation of powers issues such review might 
raise.193 Consequently, Armstrong I found that the APA does not 
empower courts to review presidential compliance with the PRA.194 
Finally, in Armstrong II, 19s the D.C. Circuit allowed very limited 
review of presidential recordkeeping. The court's ruling in Arm-
strong I had raised a troubling question: If White House agencies 
such as the NSC are subject to review but the President is not,196 
189. 924 F.2d at 293-94. 
190. 924 F.2d at 288-89. 
191. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(l) (1988) (defining agency for purposes of judicial review). 
192. 924 F.2d at 288-89; see also Bretscher, supra note 2, at 1492-93 (discussing cases that 
consider whether the President is an agency for purposes of review under the APA). 
193. 924 F.2d at 288-89; see also Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2775 (1992) 
(holding that the President is not an agency under the APA). 
194. 924 F.2d at 289. 
195. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
196. It is unclear exactly which White House entities count as agencies under recordkeep-
ing law. Recall that the FOIA explicitly defines the term agency to include White House 
entities, including establishments within the Executive Office of the President. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(t) (1988); see also supra note 114 (discussing this provision of the FOIA and its legisla-
tive history); cf. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 155-56 
(1980) (holding that notes of Kissinger's telephone conversations while he was serving as a 
presidential advisor are not subject to disclosure under the FOIA because the Office of the 
President is separate from the Executive Office of the President and thus is not included 
within the FOIA definition of agency); Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (find-
ing that the Task Force on Regulatory Relief, which was created by the President, headed by 
the Vice President, and composed of various cabinet members, was not an agency for pur-
poses of the FOIA). In addition, the PRA explicitly incorporates the FOIA definition of an 
agency when excluding "official records of an agency" from its definition of presidential 
records. 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2)(B) (1988); see also supra note 83 and accompanying text. The 
Armstrong I court clarified the distinction between White House records subject to the PRA 
and those subject to the FRA: 
Because the various components of the Executive Office of the President ("EOP") per-
form different functions, they create different kinds of records. The President, the Office 
of Vice President, and the components of the EOP whose sole responsibility is to advise 
the President are subject to the PRA and create "presidential records." The compo-
nents of the EOP that have statutory responsibility (such as the Office of Management 
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what would prevent an across-the-board, unreviewable presidential 
declaration that all White House information is properly viewed as 
presidential rather than as agency records?197 In order to escape 
this dilemma, the Armstrong II court found that the PRA permits a 
limited form of review: "[C]ourts may review guidelines outlining 
what is, and what is not, a 'presidential record' to ensure that 
materials that are not subject to the PRA are not treated as presi-
dential records. "19s 
B. Improving Enforcement of Recordkeeping Law 
The enforcement scheme established under existing federal re-
cordkeeping law has proved inadequate. Particularly in the area of 
presidential records, the existing mechanisms for administrative and 
judicial oversight of government recordkeeping practices and pro-
cedures cannot protect historically significant materials from arbi-
trary, careless, or reckless recordkeeping decisions. Accordingly, 
this section suggests that Congress should amend the recordkeeping 
statutes both to grant the Archivist a more comprehensive enforce-
ment role and to provide explicitly for limited judicial oversight. 
This section also argues that Congress would not violate separation 
of powers principles by adding an enforcement scheme to the PRA. 
1. Weaknesses in the Existing Enforcement Scheme 
The events leading to the Armstrong litigation demonstrate the 
problems that result from the inadequate enforcement scheme 
under current recordkeeping law. Over a period of several years, 
the Archivist remained idle while the Executive Office of the Presi-
and Budget and Council on Environmental Quality) are subject to the FRA and create 
"federal records." Because NSC advises the President and has statutory obligations, it 
creates both presidential and federal records. 
924 F.2d at 286 n.2; see also Bretscher, supra note 2, at 1487-88 ("The intersection of the 
PRA and the FRA within the White House is defined by the nature of the record in question 
and the character of the White House office responsible for the record."). 
197. See Bretscher, supra note 2, ~t 1506-08 (noting the PRA-FRA line drawing problem 
raised by the Armstrong I decision and anticipating Armstrong Il's solution to this problem). 
This problem is particularly evident in the case of White House entities such as the NSC that 
can create both presidential and federal records. Of course, the Clinton Administration has 
shown that this is no mere hypothetical issue by declaring that all NSC records count as 
presidential records. See supra note 8. 
198. 1 F.3d at 1294. The court distinguished its Armstrong I holding that the PRA pre-
cludes review by stating that the earlier opinion dealt with record creation, management, and 
disposal decisions, rather than the "initial classification" decisions currently under considera-
tion. 1 F.3d at 1293-94. The court also demonstrated the practical necessity of its ruling by 
conjuring up a hypothetical guideline defining presidential records as "all records produced or 
received by, or in the possession or under the control of, any government agency or em-
ployee of the United States." 1 F.3d at 1293. The court observed that "[ r]eading the PRA to 
forbid judicial review of such a guideline for conformity with the PRA definition of presiden-
tial records would be tantamount to allowing the PRA to functionally render the FOIA a 
nullity." 1 F.3d at 1293. 
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dent (BOP) and National Security Council (NSC) staff exercised 
virtually complete discretion in deciding whether to preserve or de-
lete electronic mail messages.199 The Archivist thus failed to carry 
out duties required under the FRA, including inspecting agency 
record management practices200 and notifying the head of the 
agency of any FRA violations.201 In addition, if agency records 
were indeed being destroyed in contravention of the FRA, the Ar-
chivist failed to request that the Attorney General take action.202 
As a result, by the time the Armstrong litigation commenced on the 
last day of the Reagan Administration, the only remaining e-mail 
messages were those that individual White House officials chose 
not to delete and those that were captured on backup tapes that 
were recycled every few weeks.203 The Armstrong case thus shows 
that insufficient administrative oversight of recordkeeping practices 
can subvert the preservation of a complete record of government 
decisionmak.ing. Moreover, Armstrong amply demonstrates the 
need for judicial oversight of officials who fail to carry out their 
enforcement duties under the FRA. 
The poor performance of the FRA's enforcement scheme, with 
its requirement that the Archivist oversee agency recordkeeping re-
sponsibilities, suggests that the PRA's purely discretionary scheme 
cannot succeed. Although the FRA at least holds out the hope that 
proper administrative enforcement will lead to appropriate agency 
recordkeeping practices, the PRA offers no such prospect. While a 
president is in office, neither the Archivist nor any other executive 
branch official may interfere with decisions to dispose of presiden-
tial records.204 At most, Congress may pass legislation to prevent 
destruction of presidential records,205 assuming that the Archivist 
has first exercised the discretionary power to notify Congress of the 
President's record disposal plans.206 Thus the PRA offers no ad-
ministrative enforcement mechanism to block the inappropriate 
199. See 1 F.3d at 1288 n.12 (noting that the Archivist "has never reviewed [NSC or EOP] 
recordkeeping guidelines, and has never surveyed or inspected their e-mail systems"); Arm-
strong v. Executive Office of the President, 810 F. Supp. 335, 344-46 (D.D.C. 1993) (finding 
that prior to 1988, EOP and NSC guidelines failed to instruct staff in proper handling of e-
mail information). 
200. 44 U.S.C. § 2904(c)(7) (1988). 
201. 44 u.s.c. § 2115(b) (1988). 
202. See 44 U.S.C. § 2905(a) (1988) (requiring the Archivist to ask the Attorney General 
to take action "for the recovery of records unlawfully removed and for other redress pro-
. vided by law" when the agency head fails to do so). 
203. See Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 345, 347 (D.D.C. 1989). 
204. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text. 
205. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 13, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5744. 
206. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c)-(e) (1988). 
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disposal of presidential records, and Armstrong I holds that courts 
also lack the power to prevent such action.201 
This weakness defeats the PRA's purpose of ensuring the pres-
ervation of a documentary history of the presidency.2os Particularly 
within the White House, where the line between presidential and 
agency records is somewhat arbitrary209 and where there is no indi-
cation that one class of records is more valuable than the other,210 
there is no justification for a legislative distinction that permits es-
sentially unchecked destruction of some records but not others. 
2. Strengthening the Enforcement Scheme 
a. Administrative Oversight of Presidential Recordkeeping. In 
order to preserve a complete record of presidential decisionmaking, 
Congress shoul!f add an enforcement scheme to the PRA. First and 
foremost, Congress should ensure that existing recordkeeping du-
ties are performed by amending the PRA to provide administrative 
oversight of p:residential recordkeeping. In order to effectuate this 
administrative oversight, Congress should grant the Archivist the 
same power to safeguard presidential records as is currently 
granted by the FRA to safeguard agency records - namely, the 
power to request that the Attorney General take action if presiden-
tial records are being unlawfully removed or destroyed.211 
b. Requiring Presidential Recordkeeping Guidelines. Congress 
should also amend the PRA to require the establishment of presi-
dential recordkeeping guidelines. The Archivist is more likely to 
abuse or arbitrarily exercise the power to involve the Attorney 
General in presidential recordkeeping practices if presidential re- . 
cordkeeping standards are vague or uncertain. Accordingly, in or-
der to clearly delimit the Archivist's enforcement role, the PRA 
must ensure that the Archivist can readily determine whether a de-
cision to dispose of presidential records is proper. The FRA solves 
this problem by thoroughly integrating the Archivist into the 
agency recordkeeping process; for example, the FRA requires the 
Archivist to issue guidelines to regulate agency record manage-
ment.212 Congress should similarly amend the PRA to dictate that 
the President must develop recordkeeping guidelines in coopera-
207. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text. 
208. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. 
209. See supra note 196. 
210. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
211. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing the Archivist's duty under 
the FRA to request that the Attorney General take action); see also infra notes 239-40 and 
accompanying text (considering and rejecting separation of powers objections to this 
proposal). . 
212. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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tion with the Archivist.213 This approach offers the advantage of 
ensuring that all White House officials are subject to consistent re-
cordkeeping guidelines, whether they work with presidential or 
agency records.214 
c. · Private Causes of Action To Ensure Enforcement. Next, 
Congress should amend both the PRA and the FRA tq provide ex-
plicitly a private right to challenge archivist inaction through the 
courts. As noted earlier, the Archivist failed to invoke the FRA's 
administrative enforcement mechanisms over the course of the 
events leading to the Armstrong litigation;21s a private cause of ac-
tion may therefore be necessary to spur enforcement action. The 
D.C. Circuit has found that the APA grants private parties the right 
to obtain review of recordkeeping and enforcement duties under 
the FRA.216 Congress should explicitly affirm this judicial prece-
dent, and thus prevent any chance of its being overturned, by 
amending the FRA to authorize private-party suits challenging the 
failure of an agency head or the Archivist to initiate an enforce-
ment action. · 
Similarly, if Congress amends the PRA as suggested to enable 
the Archivist to seek the Attorney General's assistance when presi-
213. Existing PRA language not only fails to involve the Archivist in the development of 
presidential record management guidelines, it also falls short of mandating specific record-
keeping practices that, if not followed, could trigger enforcement action. Instead the PRA 
simply requires, 
Through the implementation of records management controls and other necessary ac-
tions, the President shall take all such steps as may be necessary to assure that the activi-
ties, deliberations, decisions, and policies that reflect the performance of his 
constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties are adequately docu-
mented and that such records are maintained as Presidential records pursuant to the 
requirements of this section and other provisions of law. 
44 U.S.C. § 2203(a) (1988). This provision seems to leave the establishment of recordkeeping 
guidelines largely to the President's discretion, and it thus does not provide a sufficient basis 
for the Archivist to conclude that presidential records are being improperly destroyed. 
As an alternative to involving the Archivist in development of presidential recordkeeping 
guidelines, Congress could limit archivist enforcement responses to the occasions on which 
presidential record disposals fail to follow existing PRA procedures. Because the PRA cur-
rently requires the President to obtain a written statement of the Archivist's views concern-
ing a proposed record disposal, 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c}(l} (1988), Congress could permit the 
Archivist to initiate enforcement action only when the President fails to follow this proce-
dure. Although this limited administrative enforcement mechanism might at least address 
the situation presented in Armstrong, Congress should go further and impose a duty to for-
mulate guidelines that comport with the PRA. 
214. This approach would also defeat the apparent attempt of the Clinton Administration 
to claim that many White House officials are not bound by recordkeeping guidelines. See 
Douglas Jehl, White House Curbs Access to Security Council's Data, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 
1994, at A6 (reporting the White House position that all NSC materials are presidential 
rather than agency records, based on the claim that the Armstrong decisions "had forced [the 
White House] to choose between a legal position that would protect all its documents and 
one that would protect none of them"). 
215. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text. 
216. See supra notes 165-89 and accompanying text. 
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dential records are being wrongfully removed or destroyed,217 then 
private parties should be granted the right to. seek review of the 
Archivist's failure to perform this PRA enforcement duty.21s Both 
Armstrong and American Friends demonstrate the reluctance of the 
Archivist to correct improper agency recordkeeping practices; ab-
sent a judicially enforceable duty, the Archivist is surely even less 
likely to challenge presidential recordkeeping abuses. Moreover, 
such limited review would likely render more searching review of 
presidential recordkeeping practices unnecessary; the Armstrong 
courts have been forced to carefully consider White House record-
keeping practices only because White House officials and the Ar-
chivist took virtually no action to preserve historically significant 
electronic mail.219 
In addition to authorizing review of archivist inaction, Congress 
should also codify judicial review of agency guidelines under the 
FRA and presidential guidelines under an amended PRA. Again, 
both Armstrong and American Friends demonstrate the careless 
tendency ~f agencies and the Archivist to permit widespread re-
cordkeeping abuses, many of which were caused by inadequate in-
struction or oversight of agency officials.220 As the court in 
American Friends observed, judicial review need not be overly bur-
densome; instead, "the papers NARS and an agency prepare in the 
course of reaching records disposal decisions should make their ac-
tions easily reviewable with little or no extra work for them."221 
Explicit provision for judicial review of recordkeeping guidelines 
would signal a clear congressional intention that the historical pres-
ervation mandate of recordk~eping law should be aggressively 
enforced.222 
217. See supra text accompanying note 211. 
218. The separation of powers concerns raised by this proposal are addressed infra at 
notes 241-43 and accompanying text. 
219. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text. 
220. See American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(reporting the district court's finding that "the Archivist rarely exercised any review over FBI 
records disposal practices during [a] thirty-year period"); Armstrong v. Executive Office of 
the President, 810 F. Supp. 335, 344-45 (D.D.C. 1993) (noting various deficiencies in White 
House recordkeeping guidelines and finding that "the EOP's record keeping guidance to the 
staff .•. was not reasonably calculated to achieve the goals of the FRA"). 
221. 720 F.2d at 44. 
222. Although Congress might also consider providing a private cause of action to chal-
lenge an individual's failure to comply with either the FRA or the PRA, such a change in the 
enforcement scheme would raise numerous problems. As an initial matter, one might ques-
tion whether private suits could effectively block unlawful individual recordkeeping practices, 
particularly considering the time it would typically take for a private citizen to discover the 
unlawful activity and initiate legal action. Furthermore, although private-party challenges to 
individual compliance might potentially catch more transgressors, they would undercut the 
preferred and congressionally sanctioned administrative enforcement roles, thereby prevent-
. ing the Archivist, a historian with particular record management expertise, from working 
within the executive branch to ensure compliance without need for litigation. See Armstrong 
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3. Congressional Power To Strengthen the Enforcement Scheme 
Congress cited separation of powers concerns in the PRA's leg-
islative history,223 and presumably these concerns led Congress to 
grant incumbent presidents nearly complete discretion over presi-
dential recordkeeping practices.224 These concerns, however, do 
not justify the failure to give the Archivist any oversight or enforce-
ment role under the PRA.225 Rather, Supreme Court decisions in 
two cases suggest that the PRA amendments proposed above -
the grant of power to the Archivist to request that the Attorney 
General take action in the event of unlawful removal or destruction 
of presidential records and the involvement of the Archivist in for-
mulating guidelines for presidential recordkeeping - would with-
stand a separation of powers challenge. 
First, in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,226 the 
Supreme Court held that congressional regulation of presidential 
materials, standing alone, does not violate separation of powers 
principles.227 Former President Nixon challenged legislation that 
took over custody and control of his presidential materials and au-
thorized an executive branch official to regulate public access to 
those materials.228 The Court rejected this challenge, reasoning 
v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 296 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that under the FRA, the Archivist 
and the agency head may attempt to prevent unlawful disposal of records through means 
other than initiating legal action, such as "disciplining the staff involved in the unlawful ac-
tion, increasing oversight by higher agency officials, or threatening legal action"). Thus it is 
unclear whether a private right of action against individual violators would increase overall 
compliance with recordkeeping law. Additionally, judicial oversight of the recordkeeping 
practices of individual government employees raises separation of powers concerns by offer-
ing an opportunity for judicial disruption of executive branch functions at the behest of pri-
vate parties. . 
Finally, private-party challenges to individual compliance with recordkeeping law might 
impair preservation of a complete history of government decisionmaking. In the legislative 
history of the PRA, Congress recognized that recordkeeping regulations can have a "chilling 
effect" on the frank exchange of advice. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 8, reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5739; see also Sandra E. Richetti, Comment, Congressional Power vis a 
vis the President and Presidential Papers, 32 Duo. L. REv. 773, 796-97 (1994) (expressing a 
similar concern that excessive regulation of presidential recordkeeping could lead presidents 
to "screen their own communications and less readily speak openly and freely"). The threat 
of private lawsuits over individual recordkeeping practices could similarly chill open commu-
nications within the executive branch or could even lead to quicker and less thoughtful de-
struction of potentially embarrassing materials in order to prevent their premature disclosure 
to parties outside the executive branch. 
223. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5737. 
224. See Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
225. But see Richetti, supra note 222, at 796-97 (suggesting that even as currently en-
acted, the PRA might not properly defer to a president's need for communications un-
checked by any outside influence). 
226. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
227. 433 U.S. at 441-45. 
228. 433 U.S. at 429-30. The former President argued that "Congress is without power to 
delegate to a subordinate officer of the Executive Branch the decision whether to disclose 
Presidential materials and to prescribe the terms that govern any disclosure," because such a 
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that the Constitution does not "contemplate[ ] a complete division 
of authority between the three branches."229 Instead, "the proper 
inquiry focuses on the extent to which [the challenged legislation] 
prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitution-
ally assigned functions."230 Moreover, the Court noted that custody 
and control of the presidential materials remained within the execu-
tive branch, and it concluded that Congress was not impermissibly 
disrupting executive branch functions.231 
Similarly, in Morrison v. Olson,232 the Supreme Court upheld 
legislation authorizing the appointment of independent counsel 
against a separation of powers challenge.233 As in Nixon, the Court 
focused on the control retained by the executive branch. The Court 
noted various means by which the Attorney General could exercise 
control over the independent counsel; for example, the statute 
granted the Attorney General unreviewable discretion in deciding 
whether to seek appointment of an independent counsel and au-
thorized the Attorney General to remove the counsel for "good 
cause."234 The Court also observed that because Congress retained 
only the power to impeach an independent counsel, "this case does 
not involve an attempt by Congress to increase its own power at the 
expense of the Executive Branch. "235 
The Morrison Court also found that the independent counsel 
statute did not impermissibly transfer executive functions to the ju-
diciary.236 Although the statute granted the judicial branch the 
power to appoint an independent counsel, the Court noted that this 
power could only be exercised "upon the specific request of the At-
torney General."237 Finally, the Court upheld the statute's provi-
delegation would constitute "an impermissible interference by the Legislative Branch into 
matters inherently the business solely of the Executive Branch." 433 U.S. at 440. 
229. 433 U.S. at 443. 
230. 433 U.S. at 443. The Court found that mere interference with executive functions 
does not invalidate the legislation; rather, "only where the potential for disruption is present 
must we then determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote 
objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress." 433 U.S. at 443. The Court then 
cited several statutes, including the FRA and the FOIA, that permissibly regulate materials 
in the possession of the executive branch. 433 U.S. at 445. 
231. 433 U.S. at 443-45. The Court also found that the executive branch "became a party 
to the Act's regulation when President Ford signed the Act into law." 433 U.S. at 441. Fi-
nally, the Court rejected a claim that the legislation violated the confidentiality of presiden-
tial communications, finding that "Congress can legitimately act to rectify the hit-or-miss 
approach that has characterized past attempts to protect these substantial interests by en-
trusting the materials to expert handling by trusted and disinterested professionals." 433 
U.S. at453. 
232. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
233. 487 U.S. at 693-96. 
234. 487 U.S. at 696. 
235. 487 U.S. at 694. 
236. 487 U.S. at 695. 
237. 487 U.S. at 695. 
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sion for judicial review of the Attorney General's decision to 
remove an independent counsel, reasoning that such review "is a 
function that is well within the traditional power of the 
Judiciary."238 
Nixon and Morrison therefore indicate that Congress may grant 
the Archivist, an executive branch official appointed by the Presi-
dent,239 the power to request that the Attorney General take action 
if presidential records are being improperly removed or destroyed. 
Like the legislation upheld in Nixon and Morrison, a PRA provi-
sion that grants the Archivist a limited enforcement role leaves con-
trol over the executive function of presidential recordkeeping 
within the executive branch. The Archivist can only request that 
the Attorney General take action, and the Attorney General re-
tains the discretion to decide whether to initiate legal action.240 
Furthermore, as the Morrison Court emphasized, Congress would 
gain no additional control over recordkeeping practices in the exec-
utive branch. 
Nor would the courts be guilty of undue interference with exec-
utive branch functions. First, as in Morrison, the judicial branch 
would only be called upon to consider the propriety of presidential 
recordkeeping practices when requested to do so by two executive 
branch officials, the Archivist and the Attorney General. Next, as 
the Morrison Court emphasiied, a reviewing court would be per-
forming a purely judicial function - namely, determining whether 
allegedly wrongful recordkeeping practices violate the PRA and 
should therefore be enjoined. Finally, if the Archivist and the At-
torney General need to initiate legal action to prevent improper 
destruction of presidential records, the presidential staff can hardly 
respond that such an action disrupts the exercise of legitimate exec-
utive functions. Thus a PRA amendment that brings its enforce-
ment mechanisms up to the level provided by the FRA should 
survive a separation of powers challenge. 
The proposed congressional authorization of a private cause of 
action challenging the Archivist's failure to assume an enforcement 
role,241 however, raises a different separation of powers issue. Un-
like a case in which the Archivist and the Attorney General chal-
lenge presidential recordkeeping practices, a private challenge to 
archivist inaction would vest control over litigation outside the ex-
238. 487 U.S. at 695. 
239. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
240. Moreover, the Supreme Court's decision in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831·33 
(1985), indicates that the Attorney General's decision whether to take legal action would be 
presumptively unreviewable. Thus the Attorney General would be free to distinguish be-
tween charges of PRA noncompliance lodged against the President versus, for example, 
against an NSC official who is acting without presidential authorization. 
241. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text. 
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ecutive branch. But given that Armstrong I already permits private 
suits against the Archivist under the FRA,242 the same Archivist 
duty ought not be exempt from review simply because the Archivist 
allegedly is violating the PRA rather than the FRA. Of course, 
presidential recordkeeping practices would inevitably be subject to 
judicial scrutiny in such a suit; otherwise, a court could not decide 
whether the Archivist had improperly failed to seek the Attorney 
General's involvement. But so long as courts ensure that the pri-
mary focus of a private suit remains on the Archivist's inaction, the 
resulting minimal interference with presidential recordkeeping is 
offset by the substantial interest in ensuring that a history of presi-
dential decisionmaking is preserved.243 
Finally, a.PRA provision that authorizes private challenges to 
presidential recordkeeping guidelines244 would not violate separa-
tion of powers principles, provided that the courts are not involved 
in the initial development of those guidelines. Although a PRA 
amendment that requires the Archivist and the President to formu-
late presidential recordkeeping guidelines would, obviously subject 
the executive branch to additional regulation, Nixon makes clear 
that such regulation is permissible as long as executive branch offi-
cials remain in control of the process of formulating guidelines.245 
Particularly considering the strong public and congressional iriterest 
in seeing that historically significant presidential records are prop-
erly preserved, Nixon indicates that Congress may impose addi-
tional recordkeeping duties on the executive branch. Moreover, 
Armstrong II already establishes the right of private parties to claim 
that White House recordkeeping guidelines improperly classify 
records as presidential.246 Given these precedents, the slightly 
more expansive review of presidential recordkeeping guidelines 
proposed here ought not to violate separation of powers principles. 
ill. REGULATING ELECTRONIC MAIL UNDER THE ClJRRENT 
STATUTORY SCIIEME 
This Note has thus far examined the existing statutory frame-
work that governs federal recordkeeping and record disclosure, and 
242. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text. 
243. See supra note 230 {discussing Nixon's balancing test for legislation that is found to 
disrupt executive functions). In addition, the court in American Friends suggested that judi-
cial review of the Archivist's actions generally will not be burdensome. See supra note 221 
and accompanying text. 
244. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text. , 
245. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text (discussing Nixon's test for whether 
legislation violates separation of powers principles and noting that Nixon cites numerous 
examples of legislation that permissibly regulates materials in the possession of the executive 
branch). 
246. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text. 
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has surveyed the enforcement schemes that attempt to ensure com-
pliance with recordkeeping law. Part I identified the broad and uni-
fied purpose behind the recordkeeping and record disclosure 
statutes, and Part II proposed additional enforcement mechanisms 
to achieve that purpose. But even assuming universal agreement 
that recordkeeping law principally seeks to preserve historical 
materials, a record of White House decisionmaking will not be pre-
served if the Archivist and White House officials fail to identify 
properly and manage historically significant White House materials. 
Accordingly, this Part addresses a fundamental substantive ques-
tion: What attributes render government materials subject to regu-
lation under federal recordkeeping and record disclosure law? This 
in turn raises a procedural question: What guidelines will best iden-
tify and manage those materials that are subject to regulation? 
This Part argues that government officials use electronic mail to 
exchange historically significant information and concludes that e-
mail must therefore be managed under recordkeeping law. Be-
cause the statutes all speak of "records" as the basic unit of infor-
mation subject to regulation, this Part first considers the scope of 
the term records under federal law. Section ID.A argues that a test 
for determining whether materials qualify as records should focus 
on the government's use of those materials; alternative tests that 
consider the content or form of government materials fail to iden-
tify information of historical value properly. Next, section III.B 
proposes recordkeeping guidelines that address the specific chal-
lenges e-mail poses to historical preservation. 
A. The Scope of Records Under the Existing Statutory Scheme 
A case such as Armstrong that considers a novel form of govern-
ment information247 will inevitably confront the question whether 
such information counts as records and thereby qualifies for regula-
tion under the FRA and the PRA and for disclosure under the 
FOIA. There are at least two ways to determine what constitutes 
records: according to content or according to function.248 Under a 
247. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text (observing that the Armstrong litiga-
tion raises unique issues because the plaintiffs are seeking preservation and disclosure of e-
mail). 
248. A third alternative, a form-based approach to identifying records, has been resound-
ingly rejected by statutory language, courts, and commentators. First, the FRA's disposal 
provisions define records as various "documentary materials, regardless of physical form or 
characteristics." 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1988). Similarly, the PRA defines presidential records as 
"documentary materials," 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2) (1988), and then defines documentary materi-
als by means of a laundry list of various collections of information that ends with the proviso 
that the list "includ[es], but [is] not limited to, audio, audiovisual, or other electronic or 
mechanical recordations," 44 U.S.C. § 2201{1) {1988). 
Courts have also recognized that the transition from paper-based to computer-based gov-
ernment records does not bar public access via the FOIA. See Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362, 
364-65 {9th Cir. 1979) {holding that the FOIA applies to computer tapes that contain the 
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content-based approach, materials qualify as records when they 
contain valuable information - of course, the notion of "value" 
must be separately defined. In contrast, a functional approach to 
defining records inquires whether the government has used the can-
didate materials in the conduct of its business. 
This section first argues that the recordkeeping statutes provide 
definitions of records that suggest a functional approach to identify-
ing records. Next, this section considers whether a functional ap-
proach properly handles two problematic types of information -
personal materials and computer software. After comparing the 
functional approach with a content-based alternative, this section 
argues that the functional approach better identifies historically sig-
nifi.cant information. Finally, after applying the functional ap-
proach to e-mail, this section concludes that e-mail is subject to 
regulation under recordkeeping law. 
1. A Functional Approach To Identifying Records 
Because both the FRA and PRA definitions of records249 refer 
to the government's use of materials, both statutes suggest a func-
same information as IRS documents); see also Grodsky, supra note 31, at 21-23 (surveying 
cases that apply the FOIA to electronic records); Leo T. Sorokin, The Computerization of 
Government Information: Does it Circumvent Public Access Under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act and the Depository Library Program?, 24 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PR.OBS. 267, 271-73 
(1991) (arguing that court cases, legislative history, and other government materials support 
treating electronic records as within the scope of the FOIA). Nor is this rejection of a form-
based test unique to computer-based information. As technology advances, government in-
formation is inevitably recorded on new media. and courts have accordingly found that mo-
tion pictures, audio recordings, and videotapes are subject to disclosure under the FOIA. See 
Grodsky, supra note 31, at 23. 
However, the form of the information may present logistical problems that block its dis-
closure. For example, when electronic data must be processed in some way before a FOIA 
request can be satisfied, a court may deny the request if it finds that the processing amounts 
to creation of new records. Compare Long, 596 F.2d at 366 (finding that "the mere deletion 
of names, addresses, and social security numbers" from computer-based IRS records prior to 
their disclosure did not constitute record creation) with Yeager v. Drug Enforcem~nt Ad-
min., 678 F.2d 315, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that an agency need not " 'compact' or 
'collapse' " computer-based data in order to meet its FOIA duty to provide "reasonably 
segregable" nonexempt portions of records). See generally Grodsky, supra note 31, at 24-25 
(surveying Supreme Court cases bearing on the issue of record creation); Sorokin, supra, at 
276-77 (arguing that processing of computer data should not be equated with record crea-
tion). Depending on how future courts construe the agency duty to disclose "reasonably 
segregable" information under the FOIA, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988), computer-based data 
could be effectively shielded from FOIA disclosure because such data will frequently require 
some processing to be both useful and nonexempt. See Grodsky, supra note 31, at 25-31 
(analyzing cases that consider the issues of agency effort and expense in responding to FOIA 
requests and citing agency FOIA regulations that establish extremely limited duties to pro-
cess data in response to FOIA requests); Sorokin, supra, at 276-77 (also surveying cases and 
agency FOIA guidelines, and expressing concern that agencies might "arbitrarily suppress 
data by structuring their electronic retrieval systems to prevent public access to embarrassing 
information"). 
249. Recall that the FOIA does not define records at all, and that the Supreme Court 
decided in·one FOIA case to apply the FRA's definition. See supra note 113 and accompany-
ing text. 
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tional approach to identifying records. First, the FRA stipulates 
that materials qualify as records only if they are "made or received 
by an agency ... in connection with the transaction of public busi-
ness. "250 Similarly, the PRA's definition of presidential records in-
cludes only those materials that are created or received by 
presidential staff "in the course of conducting activities which relate 
to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the ... duties of the 
President. "251 
By explicitly excluding "personal records" from its definition of 
presidential records,252 however, the PRA might appear to support 
a content-based approach to identifying records. Moreover, a 
content-based test of records might be an effective way to sift out 
purely personal information that arguably does not belong in the 
government's documentary history - surely recordkeeping law 
should dictate preservation of policy statements but not invitations 
to lunch. A content-based approach solves this problem by permit-
ting disposal of those materials that contain personal information. 
Nevertheless, the language of the PRA's personal information 
exemption is more consistent with a functional approach. The PRA 
defines personal records as materials "of a purely private or non-
public character which do not relate to or have an effect upon the 
carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or cer-
emonial duties of the President."253 ijy focusing on the connection 
between the materials in question and the performance of presiden-
tial duties, rather than attempting to classify the content of the 
materials, this PRA language shows that a functional approach 
identifies personal information just as effectively as a content-based 
approach.254 For example, if the government has not used an invi-
250. 44 u.s.c. § 3301 (1988). 
251. 44 u.s.c. § 2201(2) (1988). 
252 .. See 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2)(B)(ii) (1988). 
253. 44 U.S.C. § 2201(3) (1988}. This definition also· provides illustrative examples of 
personal records, such as "diaries ..• which are not prepared or utilized for, or circulated or 
communicated in the course of, transacting Government business." 44 U.S.C. § 2201(3)(A) 
(1988). See, for example, United States v. North, 708 F. Supp. 402, 403-04 (D.D.C. 1989}, in 
which the government sought production of Oliver North's spiral notebooks as part of a 
criminal proceeding. The government argued that the notebooks were covered by the PRA 
and that consequently they were government documents in the custody of North. 708 F. 
Supp. at 403. The court rejected this argument, stating that "[a]t best, North's notebooks are 
governmental only to the extent that segregable portions are shown to have aided him in 
performing his activities while he was working at the National Security Council." 708 F. 
Supp. at 403. Because the government could not specifically show that portions of the note-
books were both relevant and used by North in his official capacity and because "the statutes 
are unclear and in a state of flux regarding which government workers are custodians, what 
documents are governmental or Presidential, and what the duties of government officials are 
regarding documents containing both notes of official matters and more personal material," 
the court declined to order North to produce the notebooks. 708 F. Supp. at 404. 
254. The House report accompanying the PRA amplifies this point by discussing materi-
als used by the President in conducting political activities; although records of political activi-
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tation to lunch in the conduct of its business, then the invitation 
need not be preserved, regardless of whether its contents are con-
sidered "personal." 
Similarly, a functional test of records solves the dilemma 
presented by FOIA requests for disclosure of arguably personal in-
formation. The FOIA does not explicitly exempt personal informa-
tion from disclosure,255 and it also provides that requests for 
disclosure may only be denied on grounds "specifically stated" 
within the statute.256 Yet courts may be reluctant to order the dis-
closure of materials that reveal the purely personal thoughts of 
agency officials.257 Accordingly, they must develop a threshold test 
of agency records that excludes personal information without resort 
to the FOIA's nine statutory exemptions. 
In Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. (BNA) v. United States De-
partment of Justice,258 the D.C. Circuit found that a functional test 
of agency records most appropriately shields personal materials 
from disclosure.259 The plaintiff in BNA sought disclosure of tele-
phone message slips, appointment calendars, and daily agendas.260 
Because the telephone message slips and appointment calendars 
simply helped individuals organize and conduct their own daily 
business and were not distributed among agency officials, the court 
concluded that they were exempt from disclosure.261 In contrast, 
the court found that the daily agendas, which were circulated 
among agency staff, were agency records subject to disclosure be-
ties might ordinarily be viewed as "personal," the report states that "an examination of the 
nature of political activities in which a President becomes involved shows that few are truly 
private and unrelated to the performance of his duties." H.R. REP. No. 1481,supranote 4, at 
12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5743. 
255. Although one of the FOIA's nine statutory exemptions from disclosure speaks of 
"intra-agency memorandums or letters," 5 U.S.C. § 552{b)(5) {1988), and another exempts 
"personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a 
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," 5 U.S.C. § 552{b)(6) (1988), the FOIA 
does not flatly exempt personal information from disclosure. 
256. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) {1988). 
257. See, e.g., Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League v. United States 
Atomic Energy Commn., 380 F. Supp. 630, 633 {N.D. Ind. 1974) (expressing concern that 
disclosure of handwritten notes "would invade the privacy of and impede the working habits 
of individual staff members"). 
258. 742 F.2d 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
259. 742 F.2d at 1493-94. 
260. 742 F.2d at 1486-88. Noting that the Kissinger case involved a similar FOIA request 
for transcripts of telephone conversations, the BNA court invoked four factors suggested by 
the Supreme Court to determine what counts as an agency record: "whether the document 
was generated within the agency, has been placed into the agency's files, is in the agency's 
control, and has been used by the agency for an agency purpose." 742 F.2d at 1494 (constru-
ing Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 157 {1980)). Tue 
Kissinger Court did not decide whether transcripts of telephone conversations qualify as 
agency records. 445 U.S. at 147. 
261. 742 F.2d at 1495-96. . 
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cause the agendas were created not for "personal convenience, but 
for the convenience of [the] staff in their conduct of official busi-
ness."262 By focusing on the use of the materials within the agency 
rather than their content, the court adopted a functional approach 
to identifying agency records.263 
Fmally, a functional test of records properly identifies nontradi-
tional collections of information - for example, computer software 
- as candidates for preservation and disclosure. Because such 
novel materials do not fit within a traditional notion of records, 
agencies have argued that they need not be disclosed.264 But any 
approach that categorically denies that software is a record would 
lead to disclosure of agency data without disclosure of the agency 
software that is often essential to understanding the data and the 
agency's use of them.265 In contrast, a functional approach would 
identify as records any computer software used by agency officials 
to analyze data as part of their decisionmaking process,266 and it 
thus would avoid fruitless inquiry into the informational value or 
record-like form of the software. 
262. 742 F.2d at 1495. 
263. See 742 F.2d at 1494. Moreover, the court explicitly rejected a content-based test for 
identifying agency records, finding that the presence of personal information "does not, by 
itself, take material outside the ambit of FOIA, for personal information can be redacted" 
prior to disclosure. 742 F.2d at 1496. Rather, the presence of personal information may 
simply indicate the "author's intended use of the documents at the time he or she created 
them," and thus should be considered only as a factor in determining whether materials were 
used for agency purposes. 742 F.2d at 1496. 
264. See, e.g., Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton v. Department of Health & Human 
Servs., 844 F. Supp. 770, 781 (D.D.C. 1993) (noting the agency's claim that computer pro-
grams are not records because "each program is merely a list of instructions for a computer 
to manipulate a database"); see also Grodsky, supra note 31, at 34 ("Some agencies have 
suggested that software is a tool used to manipulate information rather than a record ••• .''). 
265. A variation on this problem was presented in Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 
678 F.2d 315 (D.C. Cir. 1982), in which the D.C. Circuit considered a FOIA request for both 
computer-based data compiled by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and techni-
cal information describing the format and encoded content of the computer data. 678 F.2d at 
317. The DEA argued that the FOIA's "intra-agency memorandums or letters" exemption, 5 
U.S.C. § 552(b}(5} (1988), should apply to the technical information because it was only used 
within the agency to store its data. 678 F.2d at 326. The court did not decide the issue but 
noted the district court's finding that if the plaintiff's request for computer-based data were 
granted, then the data itself would no longer be solely "intra-agency," and consequently 
" 'the codes necessary to read and use the tapes would become more than intra-agency 
records.'" 678 F.2d at 326 (quoting Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Admin., No. 76 Civ. 973, 
slip op. at 9 (D.D.C. May 1, 1979) (memorandum order)). This suggests that agency data and 
the agency software used to analyze that data should be considered together, especially be-
cause the data might be virtually worthless if disclosed without the technical information 
necessary to decode it. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Federal Electronic Information Policy, 63 
TEMP. L REv. 201, 233 (1990) ("Assuming the electronic form of the underlying data is a 
record, there is no apparent reason why software and indices are not records also.'' (foot-
notes omitted)}; see also Grodsky, supra note 31, at 33-34 (discussing treatment of computer 
software as agency records under the FOIA); Sorokin, supra note 248, at 275 n.66 (same). 
266. Of course, even if computer software qualifies as agency records, it might still be 
exempt from disclosure under an FOIA exemption or, if it is a commercial product, under 
copyright law. See Perritt, supra note 265, at 233. 
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An agency's computer software might also qualify as records 
under a content-based approach if the software incorporates sub-
stantive information about agency activities. In fact, the court in 
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton v. Department of Health & 
Human Services261 adopted this content-based approach in finding 
that computer programs used by a government researcher qualified 
as agency records. 268 Because the computer programs had been 
specifically developed by the researcher in order to analyze agency 
data, the court found that they fell within a "common-sense defini-
tion" of agency records that includes any materials "written or tran-
scribed to perpetuate knowledge or events. "269 This definition 
enabled the court to distinguish between "generic word processing 
or prefabricated software" and software designed by an agency re-
searcher to analyze particular agency data; only the latter can be 
said to embody government knowledge.210 
This "common-sense" definition's admirable distinction be-
tween agency and generic software, however, is outweighed by its 
overbreadth in other contexts. For example, diaries and other per-
sonal documents clearly are intended to "perpetuate knowledge or 
events," yet BNA properly holds that they are not agency records 
unless they are used for agency purposes.211 By ignoring the 
agency's use of materials, Cleary's content-based approach improp-
erly treats as agency records any materials in the possession of 
agency officials that include any useful information whatsoever.272 
2. Electronic Mail Under a Functional Approach 
Electronic mail systems promise the ability to exchange infor-
mation easily, conveniently, and freely within a community. When 
an individual sets out to communicate with a colleague, e-mail of-
fers certain advantages. First, the colleague need not be in the of-
fice, near a phone, or otherwise available to receive the message, 
because the mailbox is always available.273 Second, communication 
267. 844 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1993). 
268. 844 F. Supp. at 781-82. 
269. 844 F. Supp. at 781-82 (relying on a definition of record from Diviaio v. Kelley, 571 
F.2d 538, 542 (10th Cir. 1978)). 
270. 844 F. Supp. at 782. Although the programs at issue in the case qualified as agency 
records, the court held them exempt from disclosure under the FOIA's "intra-agency memo-
randums or letters" exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1988), also known as the "deliberative 
process privilege." 844 F. Supp. at 782-83. Because "the computer programs reflect their 
creator's mental processes," the court found that they comprised a part of the deliberative 
process by which the researcher analyzed her data. 844 F. Supp. at 783. 
271. See 742 F.2d at 1496. 
272. Moreover, C/eary's approach is not necessarily required to prevent disclosure of ge-
neric or commercial software, because such software may be exempt from disclosure for 
other reasons. See supra note 266. 
273. MATTHEW RAPAPORT, CoMPUTER MEDIATED COMMUNICATIONS 2 (1991). 
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via e-mail is generally reliable and trackable; electronic messages 
are less easily lost in transit than their paper counterparts, and sev-
eral e-mail systems offer the option of notifying the sender when 
the message has been received.274 Third, if the sender has a com-
puter within reach, no other equipment or personnel is required: 
no printer, no secretary to take dictation and type the message, no 
messenger.275 Finally, assuming availability of a computer network, 
messages can be delivered almost instantaneously to remote loca-
tions.276 In addition to these "user-friendly" attributes, e-mail sys-
tems also provide behind-the-scenes management features, such as 
immediat~ capture of all messages in an electronic form suitable for 
long-term storage and maintenance of separate, private mailboxes 
for each individual.211 
Because the convenience of e-mail has led to heavy use by gov-
ernment officials,278 e-mail generally qualifies for preservation and 
disclosure under a functional test of record status.279 Extensive 
governmental communication via e-mail, however, also implies that 
the content of e-mail can vary widely from one message to the next. 
As content moves from one end of the substantive spectrum, where 
the message is essentially equivalent to a paper memorandum but is 
simply sent through a different medium, to the other, where the 
message is perhaps an off-the-cuff equivalent to a remark made 
while passing in the hallway, the demand for historical preservation 
diminishes. E-mail thus presents a concrete and substantial chal-
lenge for a functional approach to identifying records. In particu-
lar, in order to handle e-mail effectively, a functional approach 
must both screen out purely personal e-mail messages and solve the 
problem presented by preliminary policy musings. 
274. See THOMAS B. CRoss & MAR.JORIE B. RAlzMAN, NETWORKING: AN ELECTRONIC 
MAn. HANDBOOK 5-7 (1986). 
275. Id. at 10. 
276. Id. at 3. 
277. See Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1279-80 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (describing the e-mail systems in use in the White House). 
278. See Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1279 (noting the heavy use of the EOP and NSC e-mail 
systems); see also OTA, INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 31, at 34 (showing that over 
40% of the federal agencies responding to a 1987 survey used e-mail systems). 
279. Cf. Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1279 (observing that White House e-mail systems have 
been used "to relay lengthy substantive - even classified - 'notes' that, in content, are 
often indistinguishable from letters or memoranda"); Perritt, supra note 145, at 974 (predict-
ing that government policymaking will increasingly be done electronically). 
Closer to home, however, the University of Michigan recently denied that its electronic 
communications systems were being used for official purposes. See Dan Gillmor, Privacy on 
the Line: U-M Defends Sanctity of Electronic Exchanges, DETROIT FRIIB PREss, Apr. 15, 
1994, at lA, 9A. Although the University, as the target of a lawsuit brought under Michi-
gan's open meetings law, voluntarily released transcripts of an electronic conference in which 
University regents had participated, the University denied that it was legally obligated to do 
so. Id. Moreover, a University official made the dubious claim that "[t]he regents would 
never conduct business by electronic means - have never and will never." Id. 
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A functional test of record status not only properly identifies 
personal e-mail messages, it also provides an easily applied method 
of distinguishing between personal and governmental messages. 
This screening capability is essential because e-mail systems, by of-
fering a convenient mode of communication, frequently capture 
personal information. If it were too burdensome to identify per-
sonal e-mail messages, an agency could argue that an e-mail system 
permeated with personal information should be shielded from dis-
closure280 and perhaps even immune from recordkeeping law. As 
exemplified in RNA, however, a functional approach repudiates 
any broad claim that certain types of materials are inherently per-
sonal and hence not records. 281 Instead, a functional approach de-
mands that the record status of each e-mail message be determined 
by its role in government decisionmaking. Moreover, a functional 
test enables government officials to determine easily the record sta-
tus of e-mail messages as they are being composed; if a message 
contributes to a decisionmaking process, it qualifies as a record 
without need to decide whether it is personal.282 
Similarly, a functional approach solves the problem presented 
by e-mail messages that include preliminary policy formulations. 
Although such messages deal with matters of substantive policy, the 
need to preserve them arguably diminishes as they move toward 
more transitory or preliminary policy musings.283 The failure to 
280. See supra notes 248, 253 (observing that courts have shielded records from disclo-
sure based on the difficulty of segregating exempt from nonexempt information). 
281. See supra note 263 (noting BNA's rejection of a content-based test for personal 
materials). 
282. Indeed, the inquiry in an e-mail message case will be easier than when, for example, 
diaries or personal calendars are under consideration, because e-mail messages will nearly 
always be circulated among government officials rather than used by a single individual. 
Thus the inquiry reduces to the question whether a message relates to government business. 
283. Various government guidelines suggest different solutions to this dilemma. On the 
one hand, the NARA recordkeeping guidelines for federal agencies dictate that "[w]orking 
files, such as preliminary drafts and rough notes" must be maintained if they were "made 
available . • • for official purposes such as approval, comment, action, recommendation, 
follow-up, or to communicate with agency staff about agency business," and if "[t]hey contain 
unique information, such as substantive annotations or comments included therein, that adds 
to a proper understanding of the agency's formulation and execution of basic policies, deci-
sions, actions, or responsibilities." 36 C.F.R. § 1222.34(c) (1992). On the other hand, a De-
partment of Defense (DOD) FOIA regulation contends that "internal advice, 
recommendations, and subjective evaluations, as contrasted with factual matters, that are 
reflected in records pertaining to the decisionmaking process of an agency" are generally 
exempt from FOIA disclosure. 32 C.F.R. § 286.13(a)(5) (1994). This DOD regulation does 
not flatly contradict the NARA guideline, because the DOD regulation simply interprets the 
FOIA "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters" exemption from disclosure, 5 
U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1988}; see also Perritt, supra note 145, at 975 (asserting that "predeci-
sional electronic transactions likely are protected" by the intra-agency memorandums excep-
tion}, rather than contending that such preliminary records need not even be preserved. The 
DOD statement, however, does represent another possible approach to preservation of e-
mail, under which final agency decisions must be preserved but messages reflecting interim 
deliberations may be discarded. See OTA, INFORMING nm NATION, supra note 31, at 234 
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preserve interim policy formulations, however, would remove the 
nuances of government decisionmaking from the historical record 
and thus would arguably fail to meet the historical preservation 
mandate of recordkeeping law. In particular, the policies the gov-
ernment considers and rejects are often just as significant a part 
of history as the policies the government ultimately pursues.284 Ac-
cordingly, by making J;l.O distinction between interim and final pol-
icy statements, a functional approach to identifying records 
properly ensures that e-mail messages that contribute to policy for-
mulation at any stage qualify for preservation under recordkeeping 
law.28s 
B. Proposed Guidelines for Management of Electronic Mail 
By endorsing a functional approach to identifying records, the 
previous section argued that the technology used to communicate 
information is irrelevant to determining whether that information 
qualifies as records under the federal statutory scheme. But even if 
an agency recognizes that its use of a particular technology results 
in records, that technology may still present difficult record man-
agement issues. This section examines e-mail as an example of a 
technology that captures information in a form that resists manage-
ment under a traditional record-based approach. Yet because e-
mail systems do capture historically significant government infor-
mation, officials who formulate record management guidelines 
must find a way to fit e-mail into the existing scheme. Accordingly, 
this section outlines the necessary features of guidelines that ad-
dress the record management difficulties presented by e-mail and 
(suggesting that for both FOIA disclosure and record retention purposes, it might be neces-
sary to "distinguish[] between deliberations and final orders"); see also Perritt, supra note 
145, at 987-88 (stating that "the goal of capturing draft documents in order to record the 
process of policy-making is, to a considerable extent, unrealistic," but noting that the NARA 
staff disagrees with this conclusion). 
284. For example, the events of the Cuban missile crisis seem all the more compelling 
when augmented with the historical record that shows that Kennedy Administration officials 
contemplated the use of nuclear weapons. See Peter Kombluh & Sheryl Walter, History Held 
Hostage; 30 Years Later, We're Still Leaming the Secrets of the Cuban Missile Crisis, WASH. 
Posr, Oct. 11, 1992, at C2. 
285. These deliberations need not be immediately disclosed. The FOIA exempts deliber-
ative materials, see supra note 270, thus leaving disclosure to agency discretion. Cf. Ameri-
can Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that a time 
delay might be appropriate before releasing the historical record to private researchers). In 
addition, the PRA permits delayed disclosure of "confidential communications requesting or 
submitting advice," 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a)(5) (1988), but authorizes neither disposal of such 
communications nor continued withholding once the restrictive period has expired. See H.R. 
REP. No. 1~7, supra note 4, at 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5745; see also supra 
notes 94-99 and accompanying text (describing the PRA categorical restrictions that delay 
public disclosure of presidential materials). 
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contrasts these proposals with e-mail guidelines recently developed 
by the NARA.286 
In particular, guidelines for appropriate management of e-mail 
should include the following five features. First, guidelines should 
provide nuanced yet clear instruction to government employees, 
rather than prescribing broad rules such as "save everything." Sec-
ond, guidelines should evince the historical preservation mandate 
of recordkeeping law. Third, the Archivist. should be given the op-
portunity to express an opinion in difficult cases. Fourth, guidelines 
should seek to integrate e-mail systems into computer-based archi-
val systems. Fifth, and finally, guidelines should encourage immedi-
ate segregation of nonrecord information such as personal 
materials. 
1. The Need for Specificity in Electronic Mail Guidelines 
Federal government electronic mail guidelines must avoid the 
pitfalls of either a "save all" or a "save nothing" approach and in-
stead should stake out a middle ground that encourages judicious 
preservation of historically significant e-mail messages. As noted 
earlier, e-mail systems tend to be heavily used and therefore tend to 
capture information of varying historical importance.287 Accord-
ingly, appropriate retention and disposal of the information within 
e-mail systems demands recognition of both administrative needs 
and historical value. A guideline that simply dictates that every-
thing be saved serves neither of these needs. Indeed, unguided gov-
ernment use and retention of e-mail would not only exhaust limited 
resources,288 but would also threaten the goal of historical preserva-
tion by facilitating the collection of an undifferentiated and largely 
unmanageable mass of information without regard for its impor-
tance.289 Conversely, a guideline that grants individuals wide dis-
cretion to dispose of e-mail fails to meet the mandate of federal 
recordkeeping law that historically valuable materials must be pre-
286. See 59 Fed. Reg. 13,906 {1994). 
287. See supra notes 273-78 and accompanying text. 
288. See Perritt, supra note 145, at 983-84 (noting that although electronic technologies 
can store more information in less space, electronic storage systems still "have finite 
capacities"). 
289. See Grodsky, supra note 31, at 26 ("[A]s federal agency communication via elec-
tronic mail and other electronic vehicles intensifies, government records may have the poten-
tial to become 'buried' within computer systems."); cf. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for 
Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 160 {1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) ("We could hardly assume that Congress intended agencies to be prevented from 
surrendering all documents that might be of interest to [FOIA] requesters - so broad a rule 
would not only swamp the agencies with paper, but would also seem incompatible with the 
records management goals of the [FRA]."). 
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served.290 The NARA's e-mail guidelines recognize this, stating 
that "[b ]ecause of the widespread use of E-mail for conducting 
agency business, many E-mail documents meet the definition of a 
'record' under the Federal Records Act. "291 E-mail guidelines 
therefore should explicitly direct staff to retain those e-mail 
messages that have been circulated in the conduct of government 
business.292 
Nor should government officials attempt to avoid their e-mail 
management responsibilities by declaring that e-mail systems may 
not be used for government business.293 This approach fails to rec-
ognize the inevitable move toward policymaking through the means 
of electronic mail, particularly given its inherent convenience,294 
Worse yet, it actually creates work for government officials who 
wish to preserve historical materials because they must incorporate 
any substantive information initially included in e-mail messages 
into separate documents that fit within a narrow conception of 
records. Such an approach thus offers a choice between forsaking 
the full power of e-mail as an efficient and convenient communica-
tion tool and wasting effort by duplicating all substantive informa-
tion communicated through e-mail. Under either option, the 
government sacrifices both administrative efficiency and preserva-
tion of history. Guidelines that discourage policymaking via e-mail 
are therefore inconsistent with both bases of recordkeeping law. 
Finally, in light of the considerable power of individuals to de-
stroy e-mail records, guidelines must be clear and specific in order 
to be effective and enforceable. With each individual able to au-
290. Unfortunately, the White House initially adopted this approach to e-mail manage-
ment, granting its agency staff complete discretion to determine which messages to save and 
which to delete. See Annstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 810 F. Supp. 335, 342-43 
(D.D.C. 1993). In fact, the district court found that NSC recordkeeping guidelines en-
couraged staff to treat electronic mail as nonrecord materials. 810 F. Supp. at 343. 
291. 59 Fed. Reg. 13,907 (1994); see also Annstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 
1 F.3d 1274, 1282-83 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding that White House agency e-mail systems create 
records under the FRA and that the agencies must therefore apply the FRA's disposal stan-
dards before destroying e-mail messages). 
292. See 59 Fed. Reg. 13,908 (1994) (discussing the record status of e-mail messages in 
light of the FRA definition of records); see also supra section III.A (arguing for a functional 
test of record status). 
293. For example, the White House Office of Administration, a component of the Execu-
tive Office of the President, issued a guideline dictating that "[ e ]lectronic mail should not be 
used to convey official records information." Armstrong, 810 F. Supp. at 345. If a staff mem-
ber nonetheless sent or received a message that included record-like information, the guide-
line dictated that "the message should either be incorporated into a memorandum, or 
reduced to paper." 810 F. Supp. at 345. An NSC memorandum included a similar instruc-
tion: "Electronic mail should not be used to convey substantive information about policy 
issues when such information is not already contained or will not otherwise be contained in a 
written federal or presidential record." 810 F. Supp. at 347 n.27. 
294. See supra note 278 and accompanying text; cf. Perritt, supra note 145, at 964 {"Presi-
dent Bush reportedly used a personal computer to sketch American policy goals in the early 
hours of the Soviet coup."). 
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tonomously manage her own mailbox, a convenient system means 
convenient deletion of messages.295 This capacity for destruction is 
substantial; an entire mailbox of e-mail messages can typically be 
emptied with a few simple keystrokes and without opportunity for 
anyone to intercede or for the perpetrator to reflect further. Be-
cause recordkeeping law depends on administrative oversight to en-
sure individual compliance,296 executive officials charged with 
enforcement of recordkeeping law must rely on guidelines that 
clearly articulate and explain the criteria to be applied when judg-
ing whether an e-mail message must be preserved.297 Detailed 
guidelines ensure that individuals who make day-to-day record-
keeping decisions are properly informed about the historical preser-
vation mandate of recordkeeping law, and they also provide a 
concrete b·asis for taking enforcement action should an individual 
fail to comply. 
2. Serving the Historical Preservation Mandate 
of Recordkeeping Law 
When establishing specific criteria for e-mail management, gov-
ernment officials must evaluate each criterion in light of the over-
arching historical preservation goal of recordkeeping law. The 
district covrt in Armstrong II articulated an overall principle that 
any guideline should recognize: "[G]iven the FRA's goal of the 
preservation of records for historical purposes, the Defendants 
should err, if at all, on the side of preservation.''298 Similarly, in 
American Friends, the D.C. Circuit found that the FBl's record dis-
posal criteria did not sufficiently account for historical value; rather, 
the FBl's record disposal schedules demonstrated "that the FBI 
was only concerned about preserving. records that might serve its 
own institutional needs."299 The court also rejected the FBl's treat-
ment of so-called transitory documents, documents that were sub-
stantively incorporated into more "permanent" documents; the 
court found that such perfunctory characterization of documents 
could not be used to short-circuit a proper inquiry into a docu-
ment's "administrative, legal, or research value."300 Accordingly, 
295. See Perritt, supra note 145, at 984. 
296. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text 
297. The NARA's proposed e-mail standards emphasize that "[i]t is critical ... that agen-
cies provide sufficient information for users to distinguish Federal records from nonrecord 
materials." 59 Fed. Reg. 13,908 (1994); see also American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 
720 F.2d 29, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding that the FRA requires agencies to provide a "rea-
soned justification" for recordkeeping decisions). 
298. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 810 F. Supp. 335, 343 (D.D.C. 1993). 
299. 720 F.2d at 65. 
300. 720 F.2d at 67-68; see also 59 Fed. Reg.13,908 (1994) (requiring preservation of draft 
documents circulated via e-mail if "they contain unique information, such as annotations or 
comments, that helps explain the formulation or execution of agency policies, decisions, ac-
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rather than providing categorical rules stating that certain types of 
materials need not be preserved, guidelines should incorporate a 
test of record status that identifies historically significant materials. 
3. Giving the Archivist a Voice in Recordkeeping Decisions 
Government e-mail management guidelines should seek to take 
advantage of the Archivist's unique perspective and expertise as a 
historian. As justification for the PRA provision that requires the 
President to obtain the views of the Archivist prior to disposing of 
records,301 a House report noted "the maxim that 'those closest to 
the making of history are often the least able to judge the 
si[gn]ificance of their actions.' "302 Accordingly, guidelines should 
give the Archivist an opportunity to provide a second opinion in 
recordkeeping decisions, particularly in borderline cases. For ex-
ample, a guideline could instruct staff that "when in doubt, forward 
the record to the Archivist for an independent determination of its 
preservation value." 
4. Preserving Electronic Mail in Computer-Based Archival 
Systems 
In order to establish an easily accessible and comprehensive his-
torical record of government decisionmaking, government e-mail 
guidelines should advocate the integration of electronic communi-
cations into true archival systems.303 On the one hand, e-mail sys-
tems offer the promise of easy archiving because they capture 
information in electronic form. On the other hand, e-mail systems 
are designed for communication, not for archival purposes. A 
guideline must therefore reconcile e-mail's automatic capture of in-
formation with its threat of information diffusion. 
Because the government has a well-established system for 
archiving paper-based records, recordkeeping officials might be 
tempted to archive e-mail by reducing all historically significant 
messages to paper. Indeed, the White House initially adopted this 
solution to e-mail management by instructing staff to print "hard-
tions, or responsibilities"); supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text (demonstrating that a 
functional test of record status requires preservation of e-mail messages that include interim 
policy formulations). 
301. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
302. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 13, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5744. 
303. This section uses archival to describe a system that is designed to capture and pre-
serve information in an organized and coherent form that permits straightforward searches 
and retrievals by re~archers. For example, a database is an archival computer system. See 
Perritt, supra note 145, at 986 (contrasting an archival approach with the approach tradition-
ally taken by the National Archives, under which agencies simply forwarded information to 
the Archives in whatever format was best for its original use). 
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copy" versions of any e-mail messages that qualified as records. 304 
This approach would be defensible, however, only if the original 
electronic message and its paper form were informationally 
equivalent. But as the D.C. Circuit found in Armstrong II, paper 
printouts of e-mail messages are not sufficiently duplicative to jus-
tify deletion of the underlying electronic messages.3os The court 
identified two important differences between the hard copies and 
the underlying messages. First, a hard copy may identify senders 
and lists of recipients through codes that can only be translated by 
means of additional information not captured in the hard copy.306 
Second, the sender of a message may request an "acknowledge-
ment," consisting of a return receipt of the date and time the recipi-
ent viewed the message, but this acknowledgement information is 
not captured in the hard copy.307 The court concluded that the 
FRA's broad record.keeping mandate does not "grant agencies the 
discretion to automatically lop off a predesignated part of a whole 
series of documents that qualify as records. "308 
In addition to the deficiencies noted by the court, the hard-copy 
approach to e-mail preservation fails to take advantage of the fact 
that the information contained in e-mail messages has already been 
captured within a computer. Historians stand to lose in two ways if 
the government preserves initially computer-based information in 
paper form. First, under a paper-based scheme, the Archivist 
would face the difficult task of sifting through paper records and 
retaining only those that are appropriate for preservation; the diffi-
culty of this job suggests that the historical record will suffer as a 
consequence. This task would be far easier if the Archivist could 
use advanced computer technology to examine government infor-
mation that was created, and continues to exist, in electronic 
form.309 Second, a historian who files a FOIA request generally 
would prefer - and, with the proliferation of computer technology, 
will increasingly prefer - that the information be disclosed in a 
304. See Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 810 F. Supp. 335, 340 (D.D.C. 
1993). 
305. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1282-87 (D.C. Cir. 
1993). The White House defense of this approach was based on the FRA definition of 
records, which excludes "extra copies of documents preserved only for convenience of refer-
ence." 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1988). The White House claimed that the hard copies rendered the 
original messages mere "extra copies" that could be deleted. 1 F.3d at 1284. 
306. 1 F.3d at 1284. 
307. 1 F.3d at 1284. 
308. 1 F.3d at 1286. The court also rejected the White House claim that the FRA require-
ment that materials be "appropriate for preservation," 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1988), grants agen-
cies the discretion to decide that the information lost in reducing e-mail to hard copies does 
not merit preservation. 1 F.3d at 1285-86. 
309. See Perritt, supra note 145, at 987-88 (discussing the more sophisticated information 
archiving made possible by the underlying records existing in electronic rather than paper 
form). 
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computer-based format, because that format makes organization 
and analysis of the information easier.310 Saving only hard copies 
of e-mail messages obviously frustrates such a desire. E-mail guide-
lines should therefore take advantage of technological advances 
rather than rebelling against them.311 
In addition to providing that e-mail should remain in electronic 
form, guidelines must ensure the preservation of all information 
necessary to understand the underlying messages. Even if messages 
are faithfully preserved in individual mailboxes and even if those 
mailboxes are regularly copied to long-term storage, such as com-
puter tapes, a historian who obtains the contents of an e-mail sys-
tem will still face the daunting task of trying to interpret the data. 
As the Armstrong II court observed, e-mail messages often contain 
embedded codes - for example, a code name of a list of message 
recipients that the sender uses as a shorthand in lieu of having to 
type in the name of each individual recipient.312 The information 
necessary to translate these codes is often maintained separately 
from the mailboxes within the computer313 and thus might be over-
looked when the contents of an e-mail system are backed up on 
computer tape, archived, or disclosed. If the government fails to 
preserve this code-related information, the historical value of the e-
mail messages will be diminished.314 
Finally, e-mail guidelines should encourage the transfer of e-
mail from individual mailboxes to a true archival system, because 
the failure to do so will impede historical analysis of the inf orma-
tion captured in e-mail systems. A historian who gains access to an 
e-mail system would have to sift through a collection of messages 
that is typically not integrated beyond the level of individual mail-
boxes. Furthermore, the software available to gain access to e-mail 
messages will, again, be geared exclusively toward management of 
individual mailboxes and consequently will be of little use to a his-
torian who is more interested in examining the mail from all mail-
boxes that pertains to a particular subject. Unlike databases that 
can often be exchanged among different types of computer systems, 
310. See Grodsky, supra note 31, at 32 ("Paper printouts and other customary means of 
distributing computer-stored information may no longer satisfy public access needs."); 
Sorokin, supra note 248, at 277-78 (noting that by disclosing computer-based information in 
paper form, "[t]he agency has actually denied the [FOIA] requester one of the attributes of 
its records: that they can be easily analyzed on a computer"). 
311. See 59 Fed. Reg. 13,909 (1994) ("Agencies should consider the advantages of main-
taining their records electronically."). 
312. 1 F.3d at 1280. 
313. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 810 F. Supp. 335, 341 
(D.D.C. 1993) (noting that this is true of the White House electronic mail systems). 
314. In fact, the Armstrong II court suggested that the information necessary to interpret 
e-mail messages itself qualifies as records and therefore must be preserved under record-
keeping law. 1 F.3d at 1284 n.8. 
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e-mail systems are usually hardware- and operating system-depen-
dent, meaning that a historian must match an agency's computer 
system in order to read that agency's e-mail.315 For example, in or-
der to read tapes containing White House e-mail messages, the 
Armstrong plaintiffs would very likely either have to purchase a 
computer system that is compatible with the one used in the White 
House or develop custom computer software that translates the e-
mail into a more useful form. These potential pitfalls all demon-
strate the need for a guideline that encourages the transfer of elec-
tronic communications to true archival systems, rather than one 
that simply calls for preservation of raw e-mail data that will be of 
limited use to historians.316 
5. Segregating Nonrecord Electronic Mail 
Finally, government e-mail guidelines should require that non-
record information such as personal materials be quickly segregated 
from those e-mail messages that qualify as records. Expeditious 
segregation of nonrecord information makes the Archivist's job 
easier by reducing the amount of material that must be processed. 
Furthermore, the PRA dictates that materials must, "to the extent 
practicable," be designated as either presidential or personal 
records and must thereafter be separately maintained.317 The 
NARA's e-mail guidelines suggest that this can be achieved by ad-
ding a feature to e-mail systems that allows staff to "tag messages as 
record or nonrecord";318 any messages tagged as records could im-
mediately be copied to an archival system, rendering the original 
messages redundant and subject to deletion.319 E-mail guidelines 
should also emphasize that government officials may not simply la-
bel e-mail messages as "personal" and thereby end the inquiry into 
the preservation value of each message.320 Indeed, guidelines 
315. See Perritt, supra note 145, at 993. 
316. See Perritt, supra note 145, at 965 ("An idea shared widely among information sys-
tems professionals is that the best way to ensure retention of electronic records having archi-
val value is to design information systems with inherent archival features."). 
317. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(b) (1988}. Similarly, NARA recordkeeping regulations dictate that 
personal papers be maintained separately from agency records. 36 C.F.R. § 1222.36(b} 
(1992). The NARA regulation also states that if a document contains both personal and 
agency information, "the document shall be copied at the time of receipt, with the personal 
information deleted, and treated as a Federal record." 36 C.F.R. § 1222.36(c) (1992). 
318. 59 Fed. Reg. 13,908 (1994). · 
319. See 59 Fed. Reg. 13,910 (1994). Compliance with such a guideline would also avoid a 
difficulty confronted by courts in FOIA cases - namely, whether the information subject to 
disclosure is "reasonably segregable" from exempt information. See supra note 248. 
320. See supra notes 280-82 and accompanying text (arguing for a functional test of rec-
ord status that avoids the question whether materials include personal information). 
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should emphasize the presumption that messages do not contain 
personal information.321 
CONCLUSION 
Electronic mail systems offer their users the ability to communi-
cate as much as they want whenever they want. Accordingly, when 
e-mail systems were introduced into the White House, officials took 
advantage of them, presumably for the entire gamut of communica-
tions that such systems allow. White House e-mail messages have 
undoubtedly replaced some communications that formerly would 
have taken place in memos and some communications that for-
merly would have occurred in face-to-face conversations. The 
Watergate scandal, with its presidential tape recordings, serves as a 
powerful reminder that decisions made through conversations can 
have just as much of an impact on the nation's history as weighty 
policy formulations committed to paper. Unless the citizenry is 
willing to forgo the greater insight into government decisionmaking 
that access to White House e-mail would provide, the substantive 
content of White House electronic messages must be made avail-
able for public scrutiny. 
Unfortunately, current law does not ensure this availability. In-
stead, the enforcement and oversight provisions of recordkeeping 
law remained uninvoked while White House officials deleted 
whatever e-mail messages they wanted whenever they wanted.322 
When private citizens stepped in to halt these arbitrary recordkeep-
ing practices, they were forced to confront many legal hurdles: is-
sues of judicial review and standing,323 the claim that e-mail 
messages presumptively fail to qualify as records,324 and the conten-
tion that current law grants White House officials the discretion to 
delete any messages they want without need to consult recordkeep-
ing guidelines. 325 
The Armstrong plaintiffs have negotiated these initial obstacles 
but have yet to gain access to any White House electronic mail. 
Moreover, courts are still investigating whether new White House 
321. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 11-12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5742-43 (stating that the scope of the phrase presidential records is very broad and that the 
scope of personal records is correspondingly very narrow "since a great number of what 
might ordinarily be construed as one's private activities are, because of the nature of the 
presidency, considered to be of a public nature"); id. at 12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5743 (observing that due to the public nature of the presidency, the duty to separate presi-
dential from personal records will "involve relatively little burden because the volume of 
truly personal material is considered minuscule"). 
322. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text. 
323. See supra section II.A. 
324. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
325. See supra note 290 and accompanying text. 
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recordkeeping guidelines ensure appropriate preservation of e-mail 
messages. Finally, given the current scheme's limited enforcement 
mechanisms and their history of nonuse, one must wonder how fur-
ther arbitrary destruction of White House information can be 
prevented. 
This Note has proposed three paths to pursue. First, courts 
should insist that recordkeeping guidelines are formulated and en-
forcement duties are discharged in accordance with the needs of 
history.326 Second, Congress should strengthen the law by enhanc-
ing the Archivist's participation in presidential recordkeeping and 
by codifying limited judicial review.327 Third, White House officials 
and the Archivist should develop recordkeeping guidelines that 
mandate preservation of historically significant information regard-
less of the medium used to create or transmit it.328 Through these 
means, White House officials will be able to use any effective 
method of communication that technology can provide, yet defi-
cient White House recordkeeping practices can be either prevented 
or more quickly corr~cted, thereby ensuring a rich historical record 
of modem White House decisionmaking. 
326. See supra section I.D. 
327. See supra section 11.B.2. 
328. See supra section III.B. 
